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Signaling
Poor communities sometimes resist private investment and destroy economic surplus even if the government
has thewillingness and ability to redistribute.We interpret such acts of resistance as demands for redistribution:
Destruction contains credible information about how the affected group values surplus, and such information is
used by the government in implementing the optimal redistribution policy. The extent of destruction is increas-
ing in the extent of politicalmarginalization of the affected group. Resistance not only destroys economic surplus:
It also mutes the investor's incentives to create surplus. The government uses a tax/subsidy on the investor to
maximize weighted social surplus, and we show that the possibility of destruction may force the government
to be too soft in its negotiations with the investor. We discuss several policy instruments that have the potential
to improve welfare: These include compensation ﬂoor for the affected group, legal or ﬁnancial protection for the
investor and licensing fees for the investor.
© 2014 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Over the last few decades, local, provincial and national govern-
ments the world over have been increasingly relying on outside private
investment to provide impetus for growth in employment and output.2
Privatization has widely been promoted in developed and developing
countries alike (Galal et al., 1994; Megginson et al., 1994; World Bank,
1995) and governments have been actively pursued private capital by
providing incentives and otherwise creating conditions favorable for
investment (Oman, 2000; Stern, 2001).3 While such policies are often
favorably evaluated in terms of growth, efﬁciency and proﬁtability,
their distributional impact is questionable (McKenzie et al., 2003). On
the one hand, private investment in industries demands large transfer
of public resources from other sectors in the form of land acquisition
and infrastructure building, causing displacement and loss of livelihood
of a signiﬁcant section of the population. On the other hand, the beneﬁts
from industrial growth are unevenly distributed to different sections of
the society. With or without state intervention, the local communities
often ﬁnd themselves not compensated for such economic changes
(Ghatak and Mookherjee, in press).
Recent development policy problems related to the issues of indus-
trialization and urbanization, currently experienced in rapidly growing
economies such as China, India or several Latin American countries, ex-
hibit similar features. According to a report prepared for the World
Commission on Dams, ten million people in China have been displaced
to accommodate the hydroelectric projects in China since the 1950s
(Bartolomé et al., 2000).4 India, during the post-liberalization period,
experienced a similar pattern in loss of livelihood among rural laborers
and tribals because of acquisition of agricultural land and forest for the
purpose of industrial development (Sarkar, 2007).
Perhaps, not surprisingly, these economies at the same time had
experienced massive public resistance to these industrial policies
(Bardhan, 2006; Beinen and Waterbury, 1989; Molano, 1997; Rodrik,
1999; Stiglitz, 2002). Someof this resistancehas taken the formof actual
destruction of productive assets, disruption of production, or in some
other way creating conditions that lower the productive capacity of
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the investor. The extent of the resistance is often greater than is usually
acknowledged. The public security ministry in China ofﬁcially reported
87,000 cases of public order disturbances – in the form of protests,
picketing and petitioning – in the year 2005 alone (Lum, 2006). Cao
et al. (2008) report an overwhelmingly large number of protests
(17,900 cases with 385,000 participants in total) in the ﬁrst nine
months of 2006 in China due to the displacements caused by
government's urban expansion policy. Various studies documented an
alarmingly high number of cases of public resistance in the context of
India (Sarkar, 2007).5 Uba (2005, 2008) documents the protests in con-
nection with the government's initiative to bring private industrial
investment in the post liberalization period. Between the years 1991
and 2003, there had been more than 178 protest actions. About 24% of
these protests were strikes or demonstrations involving an average of
two million participants. The privatization process in Latin America
faced huge public opposition in the past two decades. The ruling parties
were often forced to delay or abandon the investment policies in fear of
losing political support (Hall et al., 2005).
What is puzzling about these protests is that local communities
seem to be resisting precisely what is necessary to lift them out of the
poverty trap. In a world with complete information, as long as there is
a positive surplus created from investment, the government can always
implement a suitable redistributive policy so that all the concerned
parties can bemade better off. Thus, destructive activities that ultimate-
ly reduce surplus seem counterproductive. We depart from the existing
literature on private investment by addressing the incomplete and
asymmetric information problems that closely characterize the political
economy of redistribution in developing economies. This paper studies
resistance as a rational response by purported beneﬁciaries of the in-
vestment when the government is willing and able to redistribute the
surplus from investment, but is uninformed about the beneﬁts of the in-
vestment accruing to different groups. The objective lies in analyzing
the welfare consequences of such resistance from the point of view of
a benevolent government. We further examine how resistance affects
the government's contract with the private investor, and provide a pos-
itive theory of investor-friendliness.
Governments, both authoritarian and democratic, have pursued a
wide range of approaches to mitigate public resistance, ranging from
using force to ban demonstrations and protests to active negotiations
with local communities. A prime example is the power plant project
by Enron at Dabhol in the Indian state of Maharashtra in the early
1990s. Local communities whose livelihoods were seriously damaged
due to displacement and environmental degradation, initiated a cam-
paign with demonstrations and protests in various forms including
road blocks, hunger strikes, disruption of production and boycotting
local elections. The state government used brutal force to suppress the
movement locally, but it led to a protest by human rights activists across
the world (Amnesty International, 1997), ﬁnally leading to Enron's de-
parture from India. More recently, the land acquisition policies followed
by the government in West Bengal, another Indian state, faced intense
opposition from local communities, resulting in violence and loss of
lives (Ray, 2010). On the other hand, more peaceful negotiations on
compensation with local communities have experienced mixed results.
The delay in reaching an agreeable solution sometimes results in under-
investment by the investor or discontinuation of the project. But if an
agreeable solution is reached, it is more likely to sustain in the long
run. However, there has been little attempt in understanding the com-
parative effects of these policies. In the light of the growing resistance
across industrializing countries, we face important questions regarding
the government's optimal response to public dissent and the design of
redistribution mechanisms. Based on our rational model of resistance,
we are able to provide a comparative analysis of various policy instru-
ments that have potential to improve welfare.
Our analysis rests on the following three premises.
1. Investment beneﬁts different social groups (skilled and unskilled
labor, industry and agriculture) differently. At the time the invest-
ment is made, there is considerable uncertainty about the actual dis-
tribution and extent of beneﬁts (number of jobs, multiplier effect,
etc.). These beneﬁts are known to the relevant groups only after
the investment is made, but the government cannot directly elicit
this information about the beneﬁts from the affected groups through
the democratic process. In other words, the valuation of investment
is private information to the relevant groups.
2. The affected group can signal its private information for preferential
treatment. The signaling activities can take various forms, including
demonstrations, protest, strikes or other violent means to disrupt
production. Importantly, such signaling creates negative externality
for the investor and other groups.
3. The government can redistribute beneﬁts between the affected
group and the non-affected group to maximize a composite welfare
function, and information about the groups' respective valuations is
necessary for optimal redistribution. The government does not care
directly about the proﬁts of the external investor.
The ﬁrst premise captures two speciﬁc features of the privatization
process in the developing economies. First, the realization of beneﬁts
to different social groups is not instantaneous. In many countries,
privatization has been part of a larger economic reform process. For so-
cieties undergoing economic reform, it may be hard for the government
aswell as for the social groups to foresee the actual beneﬁt that these in-
vestmentswould generate in the long run. Second,we assume existence
of an information gap between policy makers and social groups at the
interim stage. The information gap often plays a fundamental role in
the political economy of redistribution in developing countries (Ray,
2007, Ch. 14). In a centralized system, bureaucrats often lack informa-
tion on local needs. Decentralization does not necessarily reduce the
informational gap between policy maker and the community if local
agents do not function appropriately (Bardhan, 1996; Bardhan and
Mookherjee, 2006).
The second premise is motivated by the fact that the nature of anti-
investment mobilization movements in developing countries often has
externalities that accrue to the whole society. Finally, the third premise
is used as a device to understand how resistance can occur without any
rent-seeking motivation on the part of the government. We do not in-
tend this as an assertion about reality that there is never any covert
nexus between the government and the external investor. On the con-
trary, our intention in making this assumption is to demonstrate that
we may have resistance to investment even in the absence of such a
nexus. Violent protests may arise due to informational constraints in
the society even with the most benevolent of governments.
In ourmodel, there are four players: The government, an external in-
vestor and two social groups (of which one has a limited role). The gov-
ernment ﬁrst offers a tax/subsidy to the investor, based on which the
investor decides on the scale of the project. The valuation of the affected
group is realized after the size of the project is decided, and the group
signals its valuation through destructive action. The government
implements a redistribution scheme between the two groups by using
information contained in the signal. Therefore such destruction can be
interpreted in equilibrium as a demand for redistribution of surplus.
The model yields the following insights. First, if a government is
responsive to information but suffers from an informational constraint,
resistance can be used as a signal to transmit valuable information to the
policy maker. In this sense, we share features in common with a litera-
ture that interprets costly actions such as protest, delay, or other forms
of groupmobilization todisrupt productive activities as costly devices to
transmit private information (see, for example, Cramton and Tracy,
5 Several Indian states have experienced political tensions involving policies related to
private investment. In 2011, the controversies related to the land acquisition policies in
the state of West Bengal led to the overturn of the incumbent Communist Party of India,
who had been ruling the state for the preceding thirty ﬁve years.
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1992; Hart, 1989 on strikes, Lohmann, 1994 on political protest,
Harstad, 2007 on delay).
Second, the extent of resistance is critical in determining its credibil-
ity as a signal of private information. In particular, it must solve an ad-
verse selection problem — if the government offers a favorable
redistribution scheme to the affected group after observing a low level
of resistance, the affected group will have an incentive to show resis-
tance even when its actual beneﬁts from investment is high. We ﬁnd
that the extent of resistance in equilibrium is less if the government is
favorably biased toward the affected group. The affected group expects
a high post-redistribution surplus from investment when the govern-
ment is favorably biased, reducing the marginal incentive to destroy
surplus. The affected group thus internalizes the social cost of resistance
more when government is biased in their favor. In other words, the
more marginalized a group is in the political system, the more violently
it will resist private investment. This result is broadly consistent with
the general observation that in India, the more militant of anti-
privatizationmovements occur in the districts which have a higher pro-
portion of indigenous tribes.
In addition, the fact that the government values the relationship
with the investor only in terms of possible gains to the groups internal
to the society helps us endogenize the extent of investor friendliness
of the government. Our model helps us to identify conditions under
which the government subsidizes the investor at the cost of the society
or taxes the investor and distributes the proceeds in the society. Under
full information, the government subsidizes the investor when the in-
vestment has a largermarginal return to the society than to the investor,
and taxes the investor otherwise. However, the threat of surplus de-
struction mutes the investor's incentives and the government may be
forced to offermore favorable terms to the investor at the cost of society.
While it is often argued that resistance to private investment is a re-
sponse to the government selling out to the investor, we argue that
there is a reverse causality too: The possibility of resistance may
weaken the government in its negotiations with the investor and
force it to make concessions that would be unnecessary in absence
of information constraints. However, it is also possible that the gov-
ernment can act too aggressively compared to the full information
benchmark. The direction of distortion of the equilibrium tax/subsi-
dy over the full information benchmark depends on a simple com-
parison of the beneﬁts in the bad state, i.e., when the relevant
group is adversely affected. The government is too soft (aggressive)
if and only if the society's total beneﬁts in the bad state is lower
(higher) than that of the investor.
In order to assess the economic value of resistance, we compare re-
sults of our basic model with a regime where there is no signaling and
the government commits to a suboptimal redistribution scheme in ad-
vance. We ﬁnd that the government prefers the no-signaling regime
when the probability of the bad state is high or the government's bias
in favor of the affected group is sufﬁciently high. The intuition behind
the ﬁrst effect is straightforward: As resistance would occur only in
the bad state, a high probability of the bad state occurringwould reduce
the attractiveness of the costly signaling channel. The second effect is
driven by the fact that the redistribution problem is less acute when
the government is strongly biased towards the affected group. We pre-
dict conditions under which banning resistance creates a welfare
improvement.
In Section 4, we provide a welfare comparison of allowing and ban-
ning protest. In reality, governments do not face such an all-or-nothing
choice. While protests elicit socially valuable information, the govern-
ment can control the scale of destruction by committing to various
measures even before the protests occur. In Section 5, we extend our
model by including various welfare enhancing policy instruments. At
this stage, it is important to note that there are two distinct economic
problems in the paper: First, the investor creates externalities for the so-
cieties requiring the government to induce the “correct” level of
investment and second, the informational gap in redistribution.
Resistance is not only a costly source of socially useful information, it
also links the two distinct problems by distorting the investor's incen-
tives. The different policy instrumentswe study can be classiﬁed accord-
ing to the problems they address.
In the benchmark model, the government uses proportional taxes
(or subsidies) to induce the socially optimal level of investment. If in
addition, the government could charge the investor a licensing fee, it
could extract all surplus from the investor and transfer it to the soci-
ety. We study the optimal two-part tariff structure in Section 6.2.
Another policy instrument aimed at boosting investment is asset in-
surance for the investor. If the investor is compensated for surplus
lost due to resistance, signaling does not distort the investor's incen-
tives anymore.
Another class of policy instruments is aimed at striking a balance be-
tween redistributive justice and theminimizing the extent of resistance.
If the government can commit to a minimum compensation for the af-
fected group, then the extent of resistance required to credibly transmit
information about valuations is lowered. We determine the optimal
compensation ﬂoor by trading off suboptimal redistribution with re-
duced destruction and improved incentives for the investor. A judicious
combination of a compensation ﬂoor and ceiling further reduces resis-
tance while still extracting necessary information. Notice that asset
insurance for the investor also reduces destructive resistance since the
investor is paid by taxing the society, and the affected group internalizes
this cost.
While most part of the paper concentrates on the redistribution
problem by assuming that the investment project is always beneﬁcial
to the society, in an extension we study the case where the project is
bad for the society in one state and good in the other state. Our model
predicts that while there will be no resistance in the good state, there
will be maximum resistance in the bad state. In our framework, this
can be interpreted as the project being foiled because of public protests.
This prediction squareswith several observed caseswhere a projectwas
forced out or called off because of public resistance. Failed privatization
attempts of public utilities in Latin America readily come to mind as
pertinent examples.
Our paper shares common featureswith several strands ofwork. The
literature on wage bargaining between the ﬁrm management and the
union demonstrates that strikes (leading to loss of surplus) can arise
as a mechanism by which the ﬁrm can credibly transmit private
information about its proﬁtability to the union. This literature includes
Fudenberg et al. (1985), Grossman and Perry (1986), Admati and
Perry (1987), Cramton (1992), Hart (1989), Cramton and Tracy
(1992) and a host of other papers that followed. While the literature
has concentrated on different mechanisms (signaling, screening, war
of attrition or a mix of these) that can explain the duration of strikes,
the broad theme is the following: Unions initiate strikes, and the man-
agement endures strikes in order to credibly signal a low valuation of
the surplus. Harstad (2007) demonstrates a game where two parties
bargain over the share of payment for a public good, where each party
uses delay (which is costly to both parties) to signal its valuation of
the good to the other party. While our paper also relies on destruction
of economic surplus as a channel of signaling valuation, the mechanism
considered is different in two important ways. First, in our case, the so-
cial groups bargain over redistribution in the presence of an arbitrator
(the government). Second, unlike in the strikes literature, it is the
party with private information that initiates the destruction in order
to signal information to the arbitrator.6 Moreover, while the bargaining
6 Susanne Lohmann (1993, 1994, 1995a), studies costly political actions taken by in-
formed activists as a form of credible communication to the leader. Unlike our paper,
the focus of these papers is whether such actions taken by many activists can lead to ag-
gregation of dispersed information in the society. Moreover, while resistance in our paper
imposes costs on all parties involved, Lohmann studies amodelwhere the costs are entire-
ly private to the individual taking the signaling action.
126 S. Bhattacharya, T. Kundu / Journal of Development Economics 109 (2014) 124–142
Author's personal copy
literature by and large starts with an exogenously given surplus, the
amount of surplus to be bargained over is itself endogenous in our
model, due to the presence of an important third party: The investor.
The model in our paper can be interpreted as one with two groups
lobbying the government for redistributive transfer in presence
of asymmetric information. In this respect, we share similarities with
the literature on informational lobbying where interest groups use
costly signals of their private information to establish credibility (see
Austen-Smith, 1993, 1994, 1995; Austen-Smith and Wright, 1992;
Laffont, 1999; Lohmann, 1995a,b, 1998). While most of these papers
deal with informational efﬁciency, our focus is on comparing the infor-
mational beneﬁts with the cost in terms of lost economic surplus.
Esteban and Ray (2006) study an informationally constrained govern-
ment depending on lobbies for information necessary for optimally
allocating resources. The paper shows that inefﬁcient allocation may
happen due to signal jamming by richer lobbies, and therefore higher
inequality may lead to more inefﬁcient allocation of resources. The
authors conclude that inefﬁcient resource allocation in developing
countries may arise simply due to higher inequality rather than due to
bureaucratic corruption. Our paper has a similarmessage: Governments
may be forced to offer softer deals to investors as a result of endemic in-
formational problems, and not necessarily due to inherent corruption.
The paper is organized as follows. In Section 2, we introduce the
basic analytical model. Section 3 presents the benchmark full informa-
tion case and then analyzes the asymmetric information case with the
possibility of signalingwith resistance. Section 4 analyzes the asymmet-
ric information problem in absence of signaling. In Section 5, we discuss
various policy instruments that have potential to improve upon thewel-
fare obtained in the asymmetric information case. Section 6 considers
two extensions of our basic model. Section 7 discusses the implications
of our results for current policy debates and indicates directions for fu-
ture research.
2. Analytical framework
2.1. Environment
2.1.1. Role of investment
Consider a development project that beneﬁts the local economy and
suppose that the government does not have the necessary resources
(technical expertise, ﬁnancial strength, human resources) for efﬁcient
implementation. The government, G, identiﬁes an external investor,
I, with such resources to implement the project.7 G offers an invest-
ment tax τ ∈ R to the investor on the size of investment.8 A negative
value of τ implies a subsidy to the investor. I decides the size of the
project x≥ 0, after observing τ. Investment is costly and the investment
cost is given by x
2
2k, where k N 0 measures productivity of investment.
9
From an investment of scale x, an investor gets a revenue of qx with
q N 0. The parameter q can be interpreted as the price at which the in-
vestor is able to sell output generated by the project. A more rewarding
way to think of q is the following: Suppose the investment has already
been made, i.e., sunk. Now, qx is the valuation of the project from
the point of view of the investor, and thus q is the valuation per
unit of scale. The project creates economic externalities for the local
community, which for our purposes is the society. The society com-
prises of two groupsA and B, whoderive utility from the project. Groups
may have different valuations of the project. Group J's total valuation of
the project is given by vJx, J ∈ {A, B}, and valuation per unit scale is v J.
2.1.2. Informational constraints
Weassume uncertainty about the economic externality that the pro-
ject generates. The uncertainty affects the government's redistributive
concern. This can bemodeled by introducinguncertainty over the values
of vA, vB, or both. To keep themodel simple, we only consider one-sided
uncertainty.While vA is assumed to be ﬁxed, vB can be either high or low.
Thus, in ourmodel, group B should be thought of as the “affected group”.
In the low state which occurs with probability p, group B is affected ad-
versely and vB takes the value v. In the high state which occurs with
probability 1− p, vB equals v. We assume that p ∈ (0, 1) and vbv. The
distribution of vB is commonly known, but vB itself is realized after
investment is made by the investor. The realized value of vB, which we
sometimes generically denote by v, is private information to group B.
2.1.3. Redistribution and signaling
In our framework, G decides on two different kinds of redistributive
transfer. Through the investment tax, as described above, a redistribu-
tion of surplus takes place between the investor and the society. If
there is a positive investment tax (when τ N 0), G distributes the tax
revenue among the citizens. Conversely, when offering a subsidy to I
(when τ N 0), G collects the subsidy from the society.
At the ﬁnal stage, G decides on a redistributive transfer between the
two groups A and B. The timing of the redistributive transfer between
groups is particularly important in our framework. If the transfer takes
place after vB is realized, group B has an incentive to signal its private in-
formation to affect the level of redistributive transfer. In particular, irre-
spective of the true valuation, B would like to pose as a low-valuation
type to attract a higher transfer from the government. However, a
high valuation type, by deﬁnition, values the surplus more than the
low-valuation type. This creates an opportunity for the low valuation
type to credibly signal its valuation by taking (publicly observable) ac-
tion to destroy some surplus. Such destructive actions come in the
form of protests, strikes or delaying the production process by other
means. The government uses information inferred from such public ac-
tion to implement an appropriate redistribution scheme. Such signaling,
however, comes at a cost of surplus reduction which hurts all parties
concerned. We assume that by taking an action of level a, B effectively
reduces the size of investment by ax. In this sense, the action is
interpreted as the “share of output destroyed”, and we assume that
a ∈ [0, 1]. Following an action of level a, group J's payoff from the
project becomes v Jx(1 − a).
Let wJ, J= A, B denote group J's surplus before the between-groups
transfer takes place. We can write wA(a) = vAx(1 − a) + sAτx and
wB(v, a) = vx(1− a) + sBτx, where sJ is the share of group J of the tax
revenue or subsidy payment and v∈ v; vf g is the value taken by vB. We
write sB= s and sA=1− s. Note that both s and t are instruments of re-
distribution between groups. For each level of tax share s∈ (0, 1) chosen
before the signaling stage, the government can choose some intergroup
transfer t at the redistribution stage that achieves the same outcome
for each group. Therefore, the results in the benchmark model
(Sections 3 and 4) do not depend on the value of s. Henceforth, we as-
sume that s∈ (0, 1) is ﬁxed at some level and that t∈ ℝ, the redistribu-
tive transfer from group A to group B, is the only instrument that G
chooses. The post-transfer surplus of groups A and B are given by
wA−t ¼ vAx 1−að Þ þ sτx−t; and ð1Þ
wB þ t ¼ vBx 1−að Þ þ 1−sð Þτxþ t: ð2Þ
The following condition is assumed throughout our analysis.
Assumption 1. vA þ v N 0.
Assumption 1 guarantees that the total surplus generated by the
project is large enough to ensure positive surplus for the groups in
every state. By making this assumption, we move away from the
7 In our basic framework, we assume that the government is the sole buyer of the in-
vestment. A geographically speciﬁc investment opportunity (e.g. mining) may be a rele-
vant example here.
8 We consider proportional investment tax to make the analysis simple and tractable.
We check the robustness of our results with a richer tax policy in the form of two part tar-
iffs in Section 6.2.
9 Our results hold for any strictly increasing and convex cost function. The assumption
of quadratic cost function is taken for simplicity and tractability of our results.
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‘adverse selection’ problem of choosing bad projects, and focus only on
the informational problem related to the redistribution of surplus. In
Section 6.1, we discuss the case when this assumption is relaxed, and
we address the selection problem.
2.2. Payoffs
A group's payoff is given by its post-transfer surplus (Eqs. (1), (2)).
In our framework, group A is not considered as a strategic player, and
does not take any action to inﬂuence its payoff. Group B chooses the
level of action to signal its valuation of the project. The investor's payoff
is given by qx 1−að Þ− x22k−τx.10
In our framework, we do not model the government as a rent-
seeker. Instead, it plays the role of a planner with two concerns —
a) inducing private investment that is necessary for development, and
b) redistribution of surplus among different groups within the society.
Its motivation for redistribution implicitly stems from a concern over
unequal distribution of surplus. To capture the redistribution motiva-
tion, we therefore introduce a measure of inequality. The cost of
inequality to G is given by
L tð Þ ¼ λ wA−t
 
− 1−λð Þ wB þ t
 h i2
: ð3Þ
In the above expression, λ measures G's bias towards group B when
measuring the difference in post-transfer surplus.11 For λ= 1/2, this
measure of inequality is simply the square difference between two
groups' post-transfer wealth. As λ increases (decreases) from 1/2,
high post-transfer wealth of A (relative to B) is considered to be costly
to G, thus creating a bias toward group B's wealth in determining the
level of inequality.
For a given level of inequality, G prefers high total surplus of the
society. Therefore, its payoff function can be given as
W ¼ wA þwB
h i
− λ wA−t
 
− 1−λð Þ wB þ t
 h i2 ≡ S−L tð Þ: ð4Þ
The ﬁrst component in Eq. (4),wA +wB, is the total surplus S of the so-
ciety, and the second component reﬂects the loss from inequality L(t).
Both S and L depend on the action a and the affected group's valuation
v, but the redistributive transfer t affects only the inequality loss.
While the transfer t is used to minimize the weighted inequality, the
tax τ is used by the government to maximize the surplus. In what fol-
lows, we shall sometimes explicitly denote the dependence of the vari-
ables on a, v, t and write wA(a), wB(v, a), S(v, a), L(v, a, t) andW(v, a, t).
There is an alternative expression for the objective function that is
equivalent in terms of the optimal choice of the government and of the
other parties. If the government has Cobb–Douglas preferences over the
group utilities, i.e., if the objective function is (wA − t)1 − λ(wB + t)λ,
then we are really solving the same optimization problem for the gov-
ernment. Thus, the government in our model is a weighted social wel-
fare maximizer. While the Cobb–Douglas objective function is perhaps
easier to interpret, it has the problem that the expression is undeﬁned
for negative values of the utilities. Since wA and wB are themselves en-
dogenous, there is no easy way of avoiding this problem. We therefore
work with the inequality weighted objective function.
2.3. Sequence of events
The sequence of events in the basic model is described below:
1. Policy stage: G decides the investment tax/subsidy τ.
2. Investment stage: I decides the size of investment x.
3. Signaling stage: vB is realized but only B can observe vB. B takes an
action a ∈ [0, 1] to signal its valuation vB to G.
4. Redistribution stage: G decides a transfer t ∈ ℝ from A to B.
To identify the impact of signaling, we discuss an alternative
sequence of events in Section 4. In particular, we assume G determines
the transfer before vB is realized, and commits not to renegotiate
the amount. Therefore, B ﬁnds no incentive to signal through costly
action after vB is realized. The scenario effectively has three stages of
actions — policy stage, investment stage and redistribution stage.
Finally, after the redistribution stage, nature determines vB and payoffs
are realized.
3. Equilibrium analysis
We proceed to solve the model by considering three different infor-
mational regimes. First, in Section 3.2, we consider the full information
benchmark case where there is no asymmetric information: the valua-
tions are known to the government costlessly once they are realized.
Next, in Section 3.3, we proceed to the costly signaling regime, in
which the group with private information can signal its valuation
through action that is costly to the society. We will begin with describ-
ing players' strategies and the equilibrium concept for our analysis.
3.1. Strategies, belief and equilibrium concept
The strategy of the investor I is the size of investment x(τ) ∈ ℝ,
given an investment tax τ. The marginal valuation of the project to
Group B, i.e., vB∈ v; vf g is private information only to B. B's strategy is
a(τ, x, vB) ∈ [0, 1], the level of action taken after observing τ, x and vB.
G chooses two different taxes. First, it decides on an investment tax τ
∈ R that will be imposed on the investor. Finally, after observing the ac-
tion taken by B, G decides on a redistributive transfer t(τ, x, a) from A to
B. Let μ(τ, x, a) ∈ [0, 1] denote G's belief that group B has low valuation
for the project, i.e.,vB ¼ v, after observing a feasible choice tuple (τ, x, a).
We will look for the set of Perfect Bayesian Equilibria (PBE) that involves
a strategy proﬁle and a belief system such that the strategy proﬁle is se-
quentially rational and beliefs are derived by Bayes' rule when possible.
The set of signaling equilibria is large because of broad ﬂexibility per-
mitted by PBE in specifying out-of-equilibriumbeliefs. To getmore trac-
tability of our results, we restrict our attention only to the separating
equilibria satisfying the Intuitive Criterion (Cho and Kreps, 1987).12
3.2. Full information
As the benchmark, we consider a situation in which the government
can gain information about groups' valuation at no cost. It is important
to note that the realized value of vB will still be unknown at the policy
stage and the investment stage, but will only be known at the redistri-
bution stage. The total surplus available to the government for redistri-
bution within groups is then S(vB, 0) = (vA + vB + τ)x, given the
investment tax τ and the size of investment x. At the redistribution
stage, G chooses t ∈ R to maximize W(vB, 0, t), which is equivalent of
minimizing [λ(wA(0) − t) − (1 − λ)(wB(vB, 0) + t)]2. The optimal
group transfer is given by
t˚ ¼ λwA 0ð Þ− 1−λð ÞwB vB;0
 
:
10 In the basic framework, we assume that the investment tax/subsidy is contingent on
the initial size of the project. The government does not provide any insurance to the inves-
tor against the losses due to costly action.We later show in an extension that if the govern-
ment can compensate the investor for its losses by raising money from the society, the
results donot changequalitatively, but there is somewelfare improvement in equilibrium.
11 The bias toward one of the groups may result from several factors such as lobbying
power, number of swing voters etc. We are particularly interested in analyzing the
distortionary effect of this bias on private investment. 12 We ﬁnd that in this model, no pooling equilibrium survives the Intuitive Criterion.
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Essentially, the weighted loss from inequality is set to zero at this trans-
fer (i.e., L(t°)=0) and the post transfer payoff toG is simply S(vB, 0). It is
easy to check that the payoffs of groups A and B are given by (1− λ)
S(vB, 0) and λS(vB, 0) respectively.
Next, we turn to the investment stage and the policy stage. The
government decides the tax on the investor by balancing the follow-
ing tradeoff: An increase in the tax will depress investment and
therefore reduce surplus, but on the other hand, it will lead to a larg-
er transfer from the investor to the government given a scale of in-
vestment. The tax is therefore determined by balancing the
marginal valuation of investment x by the government with that of
the investor.
To solve for optimal tax and investment, we use a result which will
prove very useful throughout the rest of our analysis. Suppose that at
the policy stage, (i.e., before the valuations are made public), the
government's payoff and the investor's net proﬁt as a function of the in-
vestment x is Vx+ τx andQx− x22k−τx respectively. We can think of V as
the government's marginal valuation of investment at the policy stage.
Similarly, we think of Q as the investor's effective marginal return
from investment once the cost of the project is sunk. Alternatively, Q
can be thought of the imputed price that the investor obtains per unit
of produced output. While in the different informational regimes, V
and Q will have different values, these can be treated as constants at
the policy/investment stage of a given regime as long as they are
independent of the investment level x.
Lemma 1. Suppose the investor's pre-tax proﬁt from investment x is
Qx− x22k and the government's pre-tax payoff is Vx. Then, for any given tax
rate τ the optimal level of investment chosen by the investor is k (Q− τ).
In the policy stage, government's optimal choice of tax rate is 12 Q−Vð Þ
and the maximized payoff is k4 Q þ Vð Þ2 . Further, the investment is taxed
if and only if V b Q.
Proof. Given a tax rate τ, the optimal size of investment is given by
x τð Þ ¼ arg max
x
Qx− x
2
2k
−τx
 
¼ k Q−τð Þ . At the policy stage, the
government's payoff for any tax rate τ is Vx(τ) + τx(τ). Therefore, the
government's optimal tax rate is τ ¼ arg max
x
V þ τð Þx τð Þ ¼ 1
2
Q−Vð Þ.
Simple calculations show that the payoff of the government is k V þ τð Þ
Q−τð Þ ¼ k4 Q þ Vð Þ2. The investment is taxed if and only if τ⁎ N 0, or
equivalently, if and only if V b Q. □
Based on this result, two comments are in order. First, notice that the
government taxes the investor if the society's marginal valuation of
output V is lower than the investor's marginal return Q, and subsidizes
the investor otherwise. The tax rate is decided as if it results from an un-
derlying bargaining scenario. If after completion of the project, G has a
relatively higher stake (i.e., when V N Q), it takes a soft position in
dealing with the investor and offers a subsidy. On the other hand, if I
has a relatively high stake after completion (i.e., when V N Q), the con-
verse effect holds. This line of interpretation turns out to be useful
throughout our analysis. Comparing relative stakes of two parties after
completion of the project in different scenarios, it is easy to interpret
how and why G becomes more or less aggressive in dealing with the
investor.
Second, while we have assumed that the government is not directly
interested in the investor's proﬁts, the government's payoff increases
both in the investor's marginal return of output Q and productivity
(inverse of k). If the investor has a larger incentive to invest, then the
project sizewill be larger, leading to a larger total surplus for the society.
Therefore, a government always beneﬁts if the investor ﬁnds it beneﬁ-
cial to invest more.
Lemma1helps us determine the optimal tax and the resulting size of
investment in the full information case. When the state is known, the
government's payoff from investment x is (vA + vB + τ)x. However,
the state is not yet revealed at the policy stage. Thus, for pur-
pose of deciding the tax on the investor, the government's payoff
is (vA+ EvB+ τ)xwhereEvB ≡ 1−pð Þvþ pv. In terms of Lemma 1,when
information is costlessly available, we have V = vA + EvB + τ. On the
other hand, since there is no destruction, Q = q. As a straightforward
application of the result, the following proposition outlines the equilib-
rium actions and payoffs in absence of the informational problem.
Proposition 1. Consider a situation in which groups' marginal valuations
are public information. The equilibrium intergroup transfer is set to
make the weighted inequality loss to be zero. The equilibrium investment
is x°= k(q− τ°) and the equilibrium tax rate is τ˚ ¼ q−vA−EvB2 . The invest-
ment is taxed if and only if vA+ EvB b q. In equilibrium, G receives a payoff
of W0 ¼ k4 qþ vA þ EvB
 2
.
The proposition suggests that if the government has access to infor-
mation about group valuations, it will tax (τ N 0) the investor if the
society's expected total valuation υA + EυB of investment is less than
the investor's marginal return q and subsidize (τ b 0) the investor oth-
erwise. The apparent simplicity of the second result depends on the as-
sumptions of quadratic costs and ﬁxed marginal valuations. These
results will serve as the benchmark for the rest of the paper.
3.3. Private information and signaling
In this section, we analyze the problem when B's valuation of the
project is private information and B can signal by taking a costly public
action.We solve the game by backward induction. The following lemma
characterizes the unique separating equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive
Criterion of this game under private information.13
Lemma 2. Suppose x N 0 and Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a
unique separating equilibrium in the signaling subgame that satisﬁes the
Cho–Kreps Intuitive Criterion. In this equilibrium, group B takes a costly ac-
tion only when it realizes a low valuation from the project. The equilibrium
level of action is given by ae ¼ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þð Þ. Further, at the unique
separating equilibrium, the equilibrium intergroup transfers in both states
are set to make the weighted inequality loss to be zero.
Proof. In Appendix A. □
Based on this result, several comments are in order. First, since the
private information is perfectly revealed in a separating equilibrium,.
G can implement the optimal intergroup transfer much like the full in-
formation case. Second, since group B takes the costly action if and
only if it has low valuation,. resistance is a credible signal for low valua-
tion. The proof to Lemma 2 shows that there is an interval of actions
such that any level in that interval can be supported in a separating
equilibrium. Among all these separating equilibria, it turns out that
the only equilibrium which survives the restrictions, as described in
Lemma 2, is also the Pareto efﬁcient one. In this equilibrium, the high
valuation type is indifferent between taking the action and not doing
so. From now on, we will treat this equilibrium as our predicted out-
come of the signaling subgame.
We can now solve for the optimal size of investment and the equilib-
rium investment tax rate. Once the investment is sunk, the pre-tax mar-
ginal return for the investor isQ ¼ q 1−paeð Þ, since a proportion ae of the
produced output is lost due to resistance with probability p. And, at the
policy stage, the marginal valuation of expected surplus for G is given
13 While pooling equilibria exist in the signaling subgame, none of the pooling equilibria
satisfy the Intuitive Criterion. An analysis of the pooling equilibria is available with the
authors.
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byV ¼ υA þ EυB−pae υA þ υ . A direct application of Lemma1 allows us
to solve for the equilibrium investment size and the tax rate, which are
described in the following proposition.
Proposition 2. Assume that group B's valuations of the project is pri-
vate information and it can signal through costly public action. At the
unique separating equilibrium satisfying Intuitive Criterion, the equilib-
rium investment is xe= k(q(1− pae)− τe) and the equilibrium tax rate
is τe ¼ pa
e vAþv−qð Þ− vAþEvB−qð Þ
2 . In equilibrium, G receives an expected
payoff of We ¼ k4 vA þ EvB þ q
 
−pae vA þ v þ q
 h i2
.
From the above proposition, we see that G will tax investment
(τe N 0) if and only if
vA þ EvB−q
 
bpae vA þ v−q
 
: ð5Þ
As before, we can interpret this condition by comparing society's
expected marginal valuation with the investor's marginal return
from produced output. If G has a relatively high stake after comple-
tion (i.e., when vA þ EvB−pae vA þ v Nq 1−paeð Þ), it takes a soft posi-
tion in dealing with the investor and offers subsidy. In the converse
scenario, G will tax investment. It is easy to see that G offers a subsidy
whenever vA þ vNq. In such a case, the government's stake in both
states is comparatively high, and therefore it offers subsidy to provide
an incentive to the investor to increase size of investment. On the
other hand, when vA þ vbq, G offers subsidy if the probability of bad
state p is high or if the extent of destruction ae is high. It is worth men-
tioning here that the parameter set inwhich the government offers sub-
sidy expands compared to the full information scenario. To examine
how the possibility of resistance affects the government's investor-
friendliness, the next section formally compares the equilibrium tax τe
with the full information benchmark τ0.
3.3.1. Resistance and Investor-friendliness
We say that the government is too investor-friendly, or too soft, if
the tax rate in a given regime is lower than the benchmark full-
information tax rate for the same parameter values, and say that the
government is too aggressive if the tax rate in a given regime is higher
than the benchmark. The following proposition examines when resis-
tance makes the government too aggressive or too soft in its negotia-
tions with the investor in the above sense.
Proposition 3. Compare the case when valuations are public information
with the case when group B's valuation of the project is private information
and it can signal through costly public action. The government will be less
aggressive (i.e., τe b τo) in choosing the tax rate in the second case if and
only if vA þ vbq. Moreover, the difference between the tax offers in the
two regimes |τe − τ°| is increasing in p, the probability of the bad state
and in ae, the share of output destroyed.
Proof. We can rewrite τe as a function τ° as follows: τe ¼ τ˚þ 12pae
vA þ v−q . Therefore, τe b τo if and only if vA þ vbq. The second part
follows trivially. □
The possibility of destructive signaling introduces a distortion over
the full information benchmark, given by the difference between τe
and τ°. Increasing the tax rate has two effects: Raising revenue per
unit of investment on the one hand and depressing total investment
on the other. If vA þ vNq, the society's marginal loss from resistance is
relatively high, and society values output increase that much less. As a
consequence, the cost of output loss due to increased tax rate is lower
in the margin, and the government raises tax above τ°. On the other
hand, if the society values output relatively less in the bad state, i.e.,vA þ
vbq, then the government is softer, i.e., more investor friendly, than it
would be under full information. The second part of the proposition
says that the higher the resistance, the stronger is the distortion.
The import of Proposition 3 is that if the society's valuation in the
bad state is not very high, resistance forces the government to be too
investor friendly. While the common rhetoric suggests that such
resistance arises in response to the government being too investor-
friendly, the point of the paper is to show that a reverse causality exists.
The next section shows that higher resistance may happen due to in-
creased marginalization (decrease in λ) of the affected group. Thus,
the political structure of the society as encapsulated by λ may have a
signiﬁcant impact on the deal offered to a foreign investor and conse-
quently, on the scale of investment.
Next, we formally study how the extent of resistance depends on the
parameters of the model.
3.3.2. Destruction of output
Certain conclusions are obvious from the very set-up.We do not ob-
serve resistance to all investment, it occurs onlywhen an affected group
considers the valuation of investment to be low, and uses destructive
means to demandmore compensation. Second, since ae is independent
of the scale of investment, the total destruction aex is strictly increasing
in the scale of investment. Thus, large projects face large resistance. Also,
since high subsidies are associated with large scale projects (yielding
high social return), one can see that more destruction of total output
will be seen to occur when the volume of subsidies is high, seemingly
explaining the high correlation between increased resistance and highly
subsidized projects.
The following proposition tells us how the share of output
destroyed, ae, depends on the nature of investment project and the
political structure of the society.14
Proposition 4. As λ, which is G's bias in favor of the affected group in-
creases from 0 to 1, the optimal action ae by the group decreases monoton-
ically from 1 to 0. Ceteris paribus, ae is strictly decreasing in vA andv, strictly
increasing in v and is independent of p.
The ﬁrst part of Proposition 4 shows that the more politically mar-
ginalized the affected group is, the more destructive action it under-
takes. On the other hand, if G is favorably biased toward the affected
group, it expects a high transfer in each state. This creates an incentive
not to destroy too much of surplus, since such destruction eventually
hurts the total amount of post-transfer wealth. The optimal action ae
decreases in vA and v because an increase in these parameters increases
the marginal valuation of output in each state, creating an incentive
to destroy less. The intuition for the effect of v is a little more subtle. No-
tice that ae is determined by equating the gain in transfer from action
and the high type's cost of taking action. While an increase in v leads
to a larger transfer, it also increases the cost of misrepresentation
to the high type. In fact, a marginal increase in v increases transfer by
(1− λ)xwhile it increases cost by aex. Since ae b 1− λ, the extent of ac-
tion increases with v.
In order to better assess the economic effect of resistance onwelfare,
investment and investor-friendliness, we now study an alternative
regime — one where resistance is ruled out by assumption.
4. An alternative regime — no signaling
In the previous section, the government uses information about val-
uations to implement the optimal redistribution scheme, but such infor-
mation comes at a social cost. Additionally, the possibility of such a cost
being imposed on the investor leads to a distortion in the government's
deal with the investor. To balance the extent of the beneﬁt of optimal
redistribution against these two costs, we need to compare the
14 The proof follows from the ﬁrst order differentiation of ae, deﬁned in Lemma 2, with
respect to various parameters. The algebra is straightforward, we therefore skip the proof
of this proposition.
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government's payoff in the signaling regimewith another benchmark—
an alternative regime where there is no signaling (and therefore no
cost), and the government has to implement a redistribution scheme
without the precise knowledge of the group valuations.
In this section, we assume that the government commits not to use
information about valuations even if it is made available. Such commit-
ment takes away the incentive for signaling activity by social groups. In
reality, an announced ban on signaling will have the same effect.
The game is the same as it is in Section 3.3, except that we force the
value of a to be 0. Equivalently, there is no signaling stage. In the redis-
tribution stage, the government uses the transfer that maximizes the
expected welfare. Therefore, the tax offered to the investor is given by
tns ¼ argmax
t∈R
pW v;0; tð Þ þ 1−pð ÞW v;0; tð Þ
¼ argmax
t∈R
pL v;0; tð Þ þ 1−pð ÞL v;0; tð Þ ¼ λwA 0ð Þ− 1−λð ÞEwB vB;0
 
where EwB vB;0
 
¼ pwB v;0ð Þ þ 1−pð ÞwB v;0ð Þ. It is easy to see that G
incurs inequality losses in both states, and these losses are given by
L v;0; tns
  ¼ p 1−λð Þ v−vð Þx½ 2
L v;0; tns
  ¼ 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þx½ 2: ð6Þ
The following proposition describes the equilibrium outcome under
no-signaling.
Proposition 5. Assume that group B's valuation of the project is private
information, but it cannot convey the information to the government.
Then in the unique SPNE of the game, G incurs positive inequality loss in
both states, given by Eq. (6). The size of investment and the investment
tax are given by xns = k(q− τns) and τns ¼ q− v
AþEvBð Þ½ þ2qkF
2þ2kF respectively
where F ¼ p 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2. In equilibrium, G receives an expected
payoff of Wns ¼ k4
qþvAþEvBð Þ2
1þkF .
The proof involves simple algebra and is given in the appendix. The
following corollary establishes that the government will tax investment
if and only if the total expected marginal return to the society is greater
than a threshold strictly greater than the marginal return to the investor.
Corollary 1. Assume that group B's valuations of the project is private
information, but it cannot convey the information to the government.
Then, the government will tax the investor if and only if
vA þ EvBb q 1þ 2kFð Þ
where F ¼ p 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2N0.
In other words, when vA + EvB ∈ (q, q[1 + 2kF]), the government
taxes the investor under no-signaling while it would have subsidized
the investor under full information. Moreover, simple algebra shows
us that τns N τo. Both under the benchmark case and no-signaling case,
there is no output loss due to resistance, but in the latter case, the
surplus is suboptimally distributed across groups. Thus, the marginal
value of increased output is lower in the latter case than the benchmark.
Therefore, the government is unambiguously more aggressive with the
investor than the benchmark case when signaling is banned.
The next section formally compares the equilibrium values of the
different variables under the two regimes.
4.1. Comparison across regimes
There are two distinct motivations for studying the comparison be-
tween the two regimes. First, asmentioned before, it allows us to assess
the economic effect of resistance as a costly information channel.
Second, the government's welfare ranking over the two regimes tells
us the circumstances under which a government is better off commit-
ting to strictly enforce a ban on protest activities. However, the commit-
ment power of a government is often determined institutionally. In
particular, such a ban on protest activitiesmay be a feature of autocratic
regimes, and democratic governments may ﬁnd it hard to employ
such coercive measures even if they are potentially welfare improving.
Thus, a comparison between the two regimes can also be read as a
comparison between two different political institutions: Autocracy
and democracy.
4.1.1. Welfare
First, we compare the government's payoff under signalingwith that
under no-signaling to see when destructive resistance as a signaling
channel is overall beneﬁcial to the society.
Proposition 6. Fix vA; v; v; q
 	
and let p and λ vary as parameters. Now
compare the government's welfare in the no-signaling regime with that in
the regime where the government allows signaling. For any λ, there is a
unique cut-off p(λ) b 1 such that the government strictly prefers the no-
signaling regime if p N p(λ), strictly prefers the signaling regime if p b
p(λ), and is indifferent between the two regimes if p = p(λ). There exists
some (possibly empty) interval λ;λ

 
such that whenever λ∉ λ;λ

 
, we
have p(λ) = 0, i.e., no-signaling is preferred for all p ∈ (0, 1). We always
have λb 1, i.e., p(λ) = 0 for large enough λ. On the other hand, given
vA; v
 	
, if v is sufﬁciently small, then λ ¼ 0.
Proof. In Appendix A. □
The above proposition broadly suggests that the signaling regime
is better than the no-signaling regime if the bad outcome is rare.15
Further, when the bad outcome is severe, signaling regime is better
when the affected group is highly marginalized. Figs. 1 and 2 give
pictorial representation of the proposition for (relatively) low and
high values of v respectively. The shaded area represents the combi-
nation of λ and p for which the no-signaling equilibrium gives higher
payoff. We explain the partial intuition for these results in the next
two paragraphs.
To see how the government'swelfare in the two regimes depends on
the probability p of the bad state happening, ﬁx λ and the valuation
parameters. When p = 0, the informational problem does not exist,
and both regimes lead to the same payoff. In the no-signaling regime,
the loss due to suboptimal redistribution is the highest when the uncer-
tainty is high, i.e., when p is neither too high, nor too low. On the other
hand, the government's expected payoff in the signaling equilibrium
decreases monotonically with p since the likelihood of destruction
increases. Therefore, whenever the probability of the bad state (and
hence destruction) is high enough, the ability to prevent such destruc-
tion by committing to a suboptimal redistribution scheme makes the
government better off.
Howdoes the government's preference over groups,λ, affect itswel-
fare in each regime? Here our assumption that there is no uncertainty
over group A's valuation makes a difference. Under signaling, the differ-
ence between the transfers to the affected group in the two states is
1−λð Þ v−vð Þx, which is decreasing in λ. In this sense, the information
obtained through signaling is more valuable when λ is low. In this situ-
ation, the government prefers signalingwhen the cost of information in
terms of expected destruction is low and no-signaling when the said
cost is high. According to Proposition 4, the destruction ae is high
when the affected group is more marginalized. Therefore, the govern-
ment is better off in the signaling regime for low enough p when λ is
15 Our result contrasts with the result obtained in Spencian educational signaling where
banning signalingwouldwork better when the probability of low type is low enough. The
broad reason is simply that in ourmodel, it is the low type that signals its valuationwhere-
as in the Spencian model, it is the high type that beneﬁts from signaling. We thank a ref-
eree for pointing this out to us.
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in a moderate interval, and destruction is not very high. When λ is suf-
ﬁciently low, the share of output destroyed is very high, and the no-
signaling equilibrium is better if the total surplus is high enough, as
the amount of output lost due to destructive resistance is signiﬁcant.
Where do these ﬁndings stand in terms of comparison between au-
tocracy and democracy? Before interpreting our results, we must note
that the two institutions can differ on several important dimensions.
First, asmentioned before, employing coercive measures to mitigate re-
sistance can be difﬁcult within the institutional capacity of a democratic
system. Second, enforcing a ban on resistance demands a commitment
to limit the use of information, and such commitment may be easily
available in an autocracy. Besides, the centralized political process in
autocracies often implies that the affected groups tend to bemoremar-
ginalized compared to democracies where they have a stronger voice.
The model therefore predicts that while autocratic institutions ﬁnd it
easier to ban resistance, they can possibly be better off by allowing sig-
naling since the information obtained through signaling is more valu-
able for redistributive purposes with low λ. On the contrary, in
democracies, a large likelihood of destruction can lead to large distor-
tions, reducing the welfare under signaling regime. In both the institu-
tions, the effective use of information is typically more valuable when
themarginalization of the affected groupmakes the problem of redistri-
bution more acute.
4.1.2. Taxes and investment
Next, we compare the tax rate in the no-signaling regime with that
under signaling. We know that τns N τ°. Also, from Proposition 3, we
have that τe b τ° whenevervA þ vbq. Therefore, if vA þ vbq, the govern-
ment is less aggressive in the signaling regime. When vA þ vNq, i.e.,
when the investment has (ex ante) relatively high social externality
even in the bad state, and therefore output destruction is costlier to
the government, the comparison between τns and τe remains ambigu-
ous: In the signaling case, increase in output is devalued by destructive
resistance, and in the no-signaling case, value of increased output is
reduced by suboptimal redistribution. If the former effect is larger
(smaller) than the latter, the government is more (less) aggressive
under the signaling regime than under the no-signaling regime.
In a similar vein, the comparison between the extent of investment
in the two regimes also gives ambiguous results. We have
xe−xns ¼ k τns−τe−qpae
 :
Thus, as long as the government is not muchmore aggressive under the
no-signaling regime than under signaling, the insulation from the possi-
bility of destruction induces a higher investment in the former regime.
Indeed, for a large range of parameter values (p, q and ae), we can
have xe N xns even when τns N τe.
In an imperfect sense, comparison between these two regimes re-
ﬂects the differences in the development experiences faced by China
and India. In particular, our results in Section 4.1.1 suggest that the prac-
tice of strictures on protests may be actually welfare-reducing in China.
On the other hand, the discussion in the previous paragraph suggests an
explanation why the centralized regime in China is more successful in
attracting private investment than a democratic regime like India, with-
out adversely affecting the Chinese government's negotiation power
with the investors.
5. Policy instruments
In this section, we study two different policy options available to the
government that have potential to improve social surplus beyond the
level obtained in the signaling equilibrium studied in Section 3.3.
These are (i) ﬁnancial insurance for the investor, and (ii) a minimum
guaranteed compensation for the affected group. The ﬁrst instrument
mitigates the affected group's incentive to destroy surplus and also
reduces the investor's disincentive arising from destruction. The second
instrument allows the government to obtain information about valua-
tions at a low public cost, and optimally trades off the gains arising
from reduced destruction with suboptimal redistribution. Notice
however that while there are several policy options available to the
government that are potentially welfare improving, each such policy in-
strument requires a certain degree of pre-commitment; and therefore,
the social welfare depends crucially on the commitment power of the
government.
Fig. 1. Comparison of Signaling and no-signaling regime on the p–λ space (low υ).
Fig. 2. Comparison of Signaling and no-signaling regime on the p–λ space (high υ).
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5.1. Investment with ﬁnancial insurance
In the no-signaling regime, the government legally protects the
investor from resistance, and is forced to redistribute suboptimally.
In this section, we consider the provision of ﬁnancial protection
(instead of legal protection) to the investor. Suppose that the gov-
ernment provides an insurance to the investor ensuring full compen-
sation of the amount it lost due to resistance.16 Such an insurance
increases welfare in two ways: First, it removes the disincentive for
the investor and second, by making destruction more costly to the
society, it reduces the extent of destruction. However, destruction
has the same informational content as before and the government
can still implement the optimal redistribution policy. Moreover,
since there is no distortion of the investor's incentives due to de-
struction, the government is never forced to be too soft in negotia-
tion with the investor. In fact, the government is always too
aggressive compared to the full information benchmark since the
possibility of destruction reduces the marginal value of output.
Formally, the game is the same as in Section 3.3 except that in case B
takes an action a that destroys investor's revenue by qax,G compensates
I by the same amount. That amount is raised from the society and group
J bears a share rJ of the amount with rA + rB = 1. The resulting game is
referred to as the game with full insurance. Therefore, each group's pre-
transfer payoff is wJ(v, a) = vJx(1− a) + sJτx− rJqax, J = A, B where
sA = 1− s, sB = s, and the aggregate social surplus is
S v; að Þ ¼ vA þ v
 
x 1−að Þ þ τx−qax: ð7Þ
The government, as usual, maximizes S(v, a)− L(v, a, t).
We again use the Intuitive Criterion to reﬁne the equilibria. Howev-
er, unlike in Lemma 2, we cannot identify uniquely the level of action
satisfying the Cho–Kreps criterion in the signaling game. Nevertheless,
the following proposition tells us that in any such equilibrium of the
game with full insurance for the investor, the level of action a⁎ will be
strictly less than ae, the action in the signaling game without insurance.
Proposition 7. Consider the game with full insurance. Assume that x N 0
and Assumption 1 holds. In any separating equilibrium of the game with
full compensation that satisﬁes the Cho–Kreps Intuitive Criterion, the action
a⁎ of the low valuation type is strictly lower than ae, the corresponding
action in the game with no compensation.
Proof. In Appendix A □
Given any separating equilibrium of the signaling subgame with
action a⁎, we can derive the optimal investment and tax policy. It is
easy to see now that in the game with full insurance, the equilibrium
investment x⁎, tax τ⁎ and welfare W⁎ will be given by the same ex-
pressions as in Proposition 2, only with ae replaced by a lower level
of destruction a⁎.
Next, we turn to the welfare comparison under the three regimes:
Signaling without insurance, signaling with ﬁnancial insurance to the
investor and no-signaling. It makes a clear policy implication: Some
form of protection for the investor (either legal or ﬁnancial) is not
only better for the investor, it is better for the society too, since it
helps increase surplus.
Proposition 8. Suppose that the payoff of the government under the
unique equilibrium satisfying the Intuitive Criterion in the signaling regime
without compensation is We, the payoff in some equilibrium satisfying the
Intuitive Criterion in the signaling regime with full compensation is W⁎
and the payoff of the government in the no-signaling regime is Wns. Then
the government always prefers signaling with compensation to signaling
without compensation, i.e., W⁎ N We for all parameter values. Moreover,
for any λ there is a unique cut-off p⁎(λ) b 1 such that the W⁎ b Wns if
p N p⁎(λ), W⁎ N Wns if p b p⁎(λ), and W⁎ = Wns if p = p⁎(λ) In other
words, the government prefers signaling with compensation to no-
signaling if and only if the probability of destruction is small enough.
The proof of this proposition is exactly similar to that of Proposition 6.
Comparing expressions, it is easy to see that since a⁎ b ae, the welfare of
the government is always higher with insurance than without.
Given a choice, would the government prefer to ban destruction and
legally protect the investor or provide an insurance toﬁnancially protect
the investor? SinceW⁎ andWe have exactly the same expressions ex-
cept for different values of destruction, it turns out that we have a result
that is very similar to Proposition 6. In particular, there is a cut-off p⁎(λ)
such that no-signaling is better than signalingwith compensation if and
only if p≥ p⁎(λ).17 Moreover, whenever signaling is better than the no-
signaling regime, the government should prefer signalingwith ﬁnancial
insurance to both. Therefore, we can conclude that the government
should always consider some form of protection for the investor: Finan-
cial protection if the probability of severe outcome is low enough and
legal protection if the said probability is high.
5.2. Compensation ﬂoor for the affected group
If the government could commit to paying a minimum compensa-
tion to the affected group irrespective of whether the valuation turned
out to be high or low, then there can be a welfare improvement over
the signaling equilibrium. To seewhy, consider the no-signaling equilib-
rium. By having the same level of inter-group transfer in both states, the
government takes away the incentive to undertake any costly signaling
activity. However, an adverse effect of such a policy is that the govern-
ment incurs the inequality loss in both states. In comparison, a compen-
sation ﬂoor trades off the negative effect of resistance with the
inequality loss by reducing the difference between transfer in the two
states.18 We are interested in ﬁnding the optimal compensation ﬂoor
and the associated redistributive policy in this set-up.
The precisemechanism bywhich a compensation ﬂoor yields a wel-
fare improvement is as follows. Suppose that in the signaling equilibri-
um, the transfers to group B are t v; aeð Þ and t v;0ð Þ in the low and high
state respectively, and assume that 0bt v;0ð Þbt v; aeð Þ . Notice that
these transfers implement the optimal redistribution in each state. Sup-
pose now that the compensation ﬂoor T is set at t v;0ð ÞbTbt v; aeð Þ. If the
state is revealed to be bad, the government can still implement the
optimal transfer. But if the state is revealed to be good, the government
has to pay theminimumcommitted amount T. The difference in transfer
between the two states is reduced by an amount T−t v;0ð Þ. This makes
lying less attractive for the high valuation type and reduces the level of
destruction of surplus required for credible information revelation.
Therefore, the information about valuation is available at a lower loss
of surplus and consequently, a lower distortion of the investor's incen-
tives. However, the gain is traded off against the suboptimal redistribu-
tion in the high state.
Formally speaking, suppose that at the start of the game, the govern-
ment announces a minimum transfer T to group B as a function of x, a
and τ. In order to keep things both tractable and to give economic
meaning to the set-up, we need to assume that (a) vN0, (b) λN vvþvA
and (c) s= λ. Assumption (a) ensures that in any separating equilib-
rium, the transfer in the bad state is higher than that in the low state,
16 However, such compensation in reality may not always be feasible in practical terms.
First, theremay be accounting problems in estimating damages, and related issues ofmor-
al hazard or adverse selection. Second, making such compensation may be politically dif-
ﬁcult. This is the sense in which the instrument calls for commitment.
17 The proof is very similar to that of Proposition 6.
18 We are thankful to one of the referees for pointing this intuition to us.
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and therefore, any amount beyond the ﬂoor is paid only when the
valuation is low. Assumption (b) implies that the transfer in each
state is positive, i.e., group B is always a net recipient. Assumption
(c) is needed to ensure that tax share considerations do not enter
into the calculation of the optimal action. Given these assumptions,
we look for the optimal ﬂoor T∗(x, a, τ) that maximizes the
government's equilibrium welfare.
First, notice that since we can always obtain the equilibrium out-
come without the ﬂoor (i.e., the outcome in Proposition 2) by setting T
low enough. Therefore, the optimal T⁎ always obtains a weak welfare
improvement over the case where the government cannot commit to
a particular redistribution scheme. The following proposition now tells
us that the optimal ﬂoor has a particularly simple form. If the invest-
ment opportunity is sufﬁciently attractive for the investor, the optimal
ﬂoor promises to group B a constant amount C⁎ in addition to the
optimal transfer in the good state.
Proposition 9. Assume that q is sufﬁciently large, and assumptions (a),
(b) and (c) are satisﬁed in addition to Assumption 1. Suppose the gov-
ernment commits to a minimum transfer T(x, a, τ) to group B at the
beginning of the game. Among all such transfers, the government's
welfare in the equilibrium satisfying Cho–Kreps criterion is maximized
by setting T ¼ λS v;0ð Þ þ C , where C ¼ p2 1−pð Þ v
Aþv
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þ
 
. In
equilibrium, group B takes a costly action af only when it realizes a low
valuation from the project, and the extent of such action is less than that
without the compensation ﬂoor, i.e., af b ae. The government implements
an efﬁcient redistribution scheme when the valuation is low and pays
group B the ﬂoor amount when the valuation is high.
Proof. In Appendix A. □
In absence of a compensation ﬂoor, the difference between the opti-
mal redistributive transfers in the two states, is 1−λð Þ v−vð Þx. By com-
mitting to overpay group B by an amount C⁎ in the high valuation state,
the government reduces the difference to 1−λð Þ v−vð Þx−C in the sig-
naling game: This reduces the extent of surplus destruction required by
the low valuation type to credibly transmit information. Notice that the
extent of “overpayment” C⁎ in the high state must be strictly less than
1−λð Þ v−vð Þx. Otherwise, the government has to pay T⁎ in both states
andwewill have no information revealed in equilibrium. This is the rea-
son why we require that q be large enough: A large q ensures that x is
sufﬁciently large without affecting C⁎. Wewould obtain the same result
if we assumed that v−v is sufﬁciently large.
5.3. Redistribution with compensation ﬂoor and ceiling
While a prudently chosen compensation ﬂoor can deliver a higher
welfare than the separating equilibrium without such a ﬂoor, it is
not necessarily better than the welfare in the equilibrium with no-
signaling studied in Section 4. In case of a compensation ﬂoor, the
government commits only to overpay above the optimal transfer. In
order to induce a pooling outcome with a compensation ﬂoor, the
government has to overpay in both states (and set T Nt v;0ð Þ). However,
we have seen in Section 4 that the optimal transfer scheme tns among
those that induce the pooling outcome requires an overpayment in
the high state and an underpayment in the low state. Therefore, the
government can dobetter than using a compensationﬂoor if it can com-
mit to limit its ability to optimally redistribute in both states (rather
than just in the high state, as is the case with the compensation ﬂoor).
A redistribution policy with a commitment to a minimum transfer T
and a maximum transfer T to the affected group works exactly the
same way.
By setting T ¼ T ¼ tns, the government can induce the best pooling
outcome as obtained in Section 4. By setting T ¼ T and T very high,
the outcome with the best compensation ﬂoor can be induced.
Therefore, if the pair T ; T
 
is chosen optimally, it is possible to (weakly)
improve over the welfare obtained either with no commitment or a
commitment to not use any information. The full characterization of
the optimal redistribution policy with ﬂoor and ceiling is beyond
the scope of the paper. However, it is easy to show that the affected
group will be undercompensated in the low valuation state and
overcompensated in the high valuation state. Moreover, action will be
taken only in the low valuation state and the extent of action will be
lower than ae.
Therefore, a policy of committing to a ceiling and a ﬂoor to compen-
sation will do better than either banning resistance or having just a
compensation ﬂoor (or just a ceiling). In this context, several comments
are in order. First, as is clear from the above discussion, the extent of
welfare improvement over the equilibrium depends on the commit-
ment power of a government. Such commitment power may often
depend on the social, political and historical environment. In other
words, not all such policy instruments may be available to a certain
government. Second, it must be noted that even with an optimally
chosen ceiling and a ﬂoor, the welfare is lower than in the full infor-
mation benchmark studied in Section 3.2. In other words, the cost of
obtaining information through resistance (and consequent distor-
tion of investor's incentives) does not go away. Third, there are
other instruments for the government to increase social surplus
which can be potentially used in combination with compensation
ﬂoors and ceilings. For example, the government can extract surplus
from the investor using a two-part tariff. We touch upon this instru-
ment in the next section.
6. Extensions
In this section, we study two extensions of our basic model. First,
we study a modiﬁcation of Assumption 1 (that ensures that a project
is always beneﬁcial ex-post) and study the case where at the low val-
uation state, the project has negative social valuation. Second, we
consider how our results would change if the government could ex-
tract surplus from the investor using a two-part tariff rather than
proportional taxes.
6.1. The selection problem
So far, we have assumed that vA+ vB N 0 in both states, and therefore
the government's problem is one of optimal redistribution of the surplus
created by the investor. In this section,wemodify Assumption 1 and con-
sider the problemof project selection. In this case, we assume thatυA þ υ
N0whileυA þ υb0. In otherwords, in the low state, the society'smargin-
al valuation of surplus is negative. The following result then suggests that
in the unique Cho–Kreps equilibrium of the signaling game, all the sur-
plus is destroyed by the affected group in the low state.
Proposition 10. Suppose x N 0 and consider the selection problem. Then
there exists a unique separating equilibrium in the signaling subgame
that satisﬁes the Cho–Kreps Intuitive Criterion. In this equilibrium, group
B takes a costly action only when it realizes a low valuation from the
project. The equilibrium level of action is given by ae = 1.
Proof. In Appendix A. □
In the context of our model, the fact that all surplus is destroyed
should be taken to mean that the project is called off because of public
resistance. The above proposition suggests that if a project creates a
negative value for the society, it is forced out by the affected group
and if it creates a positive value, there is no resistance. This observation
allows us to square with the observed reality that sometimes the public
resistance is so extreme that the investor has to make a complete re-
treat. As discussed before, this has been the case with the Dabhol
Power Project by Enron in the state of Maharashtra in India, the Tata
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Nano project at Singur in the state of West Bengal in India and several
other cases of failed privatization attempts with public utilities in Latin
America, of which the Cochabamba water wars in Bolivia have often
received special mention in the literature.
Such an outcome can be inefﬁcient from the point of view of surplus
creation. The society fails to take advantage of the fact that if the inves-
tor ﬁnds the investment attractive enough, then a large tax revenue
may compensate for the negative marginal valuation in the low state
(i.e., even if vA þ vb0, we may have qþ vA þ vN0).
To understandwhy there is complete destruction of surplus in a bad
state whenever vA þ vb0, we need to consider carefully the timing of
the game. In the benchmark model, the tax rate τ is contracted upon
and the project size x is determined before the valuations are realized.
Therefore, at the signaling stage, the total tax revenue τx is already
taken as given. This tax revenue is shared in the ratio λ:1− λ between
the two groups irrespective of the level of action and of the realized val-
uation of the affected group. In any separating equilibriumof the signal-
ing game, the utility for the affected group in the low valuation state is
wB ajυð Þ ¼ λ υA þ υ x 1−að Þ þ λτx. The Cho-Keps criterion selects the
"best" among these separating equilibria from the point of view of the
affected group.
When the social marginal valuation of the investor's output is posi-
tive vA þ vN0 ;wB ajvð Þ decreases in the action a, the Cho–Kreps crite-
rion selects the equilibrium with minimal level of action necessary for
separation. On the other hand, in the project selection problem, wB
ajvð Þ is increasing in a since action destroys negative surplus, and
thus, the Cho–Kreps outcome in any signaling subgame is a = 1. In
such situations, banning of resistance or ﬁnancial insurance for the
investor have the potential to improve welfare by preventing a com-
plete retreat and generating tax revenues.
6.2. Two part tariff
While we consider proportional taxation in the main body of the
paper, it is probably more natural to assume that the government can
indeed charge the investor a license fee for doing business in addition
to the tax per unit of investment (or output). Therefore, consider the fol-
lowing tax structure: τ0 + τ1x, where τ0 is the “entry free” and τ1 is the
per unit tax. These are both objects of choice by the government. As
standard theory suggests, the two part tariff is optimally set in order
to capture all of the investor's proﬁts. As a result, we will always have
τ1 b 0 and τ0 N 0. Moreover, the government will set a per unit subsidy
(−τ1) exactly equal to its expected marginal valuation. While it is difﬁ-
cult to deﬁne investor-friendliness in the standardway here, in order to
compare with the results in themain body of the paper, we say that the
government taxes the investor if the total transfer to the society τ0 +
τ1x N 0; and subsidizes if τ0 + τ1x b 0. While the ﬁnal payoff of the in-
vestor is always zero, the interpretation of an overall tax or overall
subsidy is the following: Suppose xb is the cut-off level of investment
above (below) which the investor would have made a negative (pos-
itive) proﬁt in absence of any taxes. Then, an overall tax in a two-part
tariff would mean that the investor is producing less than xb and an
overall subsidy would mean that the investor produces greater
than xb. If the marginal valuation of the society for surplus is high
enough, the government subsidizes the investor enough to produce
at a scale that would amount to a loss for the investor. Since the in-
vestor is (exactly) compensated for this loss, it indeed produces an
amount greater than xb.
In Appendix B, we solve the model with two-part tariff for the three
cases: (i) full information benchmark, (ii) signaling equilibrium with
private information, and (iii) no-signaling equilibrium and compare. It
is no surprise that since the government can now capture the investor's
entire surplus, its payoff increases in every case. On the other hand, all
the existing comparison results of the model with proportional taxes
go through in the qualitative sense once we adopt the abovementioned
deﬁnition of overall tax/subsidy. In particular, the respective conditions
for taxation vs. subsidization remains completely unchanged for the
full-information case and the signaling equilibrium.
Unlike proportional taxation, the two part tariff allows the govern-
ment to use two different instruments to meet the two objectives of
rent extraction and providing incentives to the investor. In this sense,
the case of two part tariff shares certain similarities with the case of ﬁ-
nancial insurance in which insurance acts as a mean of incentive provi-
sion. However, the comparison between the two cases is ambiguous.
Financial insurance improves the payoff over signaling equilibrium by
reducing the amount of resistance. Two part tariff, on the other hand,
ensures efﬁcient investment, but for a high level of resistance. The
welfare comparison between the two cases depends on the relative
levels of resistance needed for information revelation.
7. Discussion
7.1. Implications of the model
We posit that destructive protest may have informational value
for the government especially in a less developed society where
the bottom-up channels of information may not work very well.
Interpreting resistance as demands for redistribution, we ﬁnd that
marginalized sections of the society respond more aggressively with
resistance. Such a result is consistent with the observation that more
aggressive forms of anti-privatization movements in India occurred in
the districts with higher proportion of indigenous tribes. An important
implication of this ﬁnding therefore is that the affected communities
should be involved more in the policy making process to use the in-
vestment opportunities efﬁciently. An interesting example is the
public–private partnership practiced in the planning and construction
of the Cochin International Airport in Indian state of Kerala. More than
1300 acres of land was acquired from 2300 landowners and led to the
displacement of a signiﬁcant number of households (Raghuram and
Varkkey, 2001). While public resistance had been observed regularly
at the early stages of development, the local government sets up nego-
tiation committees with active participation from local communities
and political representatives. The governmentwas successful in coming
up with a sustainable compensation and rehabilitation plan for the
displaced households, and also managed to implement the work
process without further resistance.
From the policy angle, another important question is how the gov-
ernment should respond to public dissentwhen the informational prob-
lem is acute. The model predicts that it is indeed strategically optimal
from welfare consideration to allow resistance when resistance is ex
ante less likely or the value of information is highly important from
the redistribution concern (this happens if the affected group is moder-
ately marginalized). However, the government does not face a binary
choice between banning protest and allowing it — by committing to
certain policy measures before the investment is made, it can contain
the scale of destruction and still elicit the necessary information. We
provide a detailed analysis of some such policy instruments. We show
that a two-part tariff (i.e., a license fee-cum-tax) ensures optimal invest-
ment for any given level of resistance, and some combination of a judi-
ciously chosen minimum and maximum transfer for the affected group
is the best policy for redistributing a given amount of surplus.
Speciﬁcally, a policy of committing to a sufﬁciently high minimum
transfer to the affected group has important implications in the context
of current land acquisition debate in India. The existing land acquisition
policy in India had been heavily criticized on the grounds of insufﬁcient
compensation and resettlement prospects for the displaced population
(Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011). The recent recommendation in the form of
Land Acquisition and Rehabilitation and Resettlement bill (LARR
2011), on the contrary, suggests over-compensating the affected
group. While the new bill has been criticized on various aspects includ-
ing arbitrary determination of compensation and distorted incentives
for investing in land quality, we predict a different positive impact of
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over-compensation which is not discussed so far in the existing litera-
ture.19 Speciﬁcally, over-compensation through inter-group transfer
can mitigate resistance incentives, and thereby creates an indirect pos-
itive effect on government's ability to dealwith the investor. In addition,
we calculate a formula for the optimal compensation ﬂoor which can
guide the determination of compensation for the affected groups.
Moreover, in order to develop a theory of the government's investor
friendliness, we model the government as a weighted social welfare
maximizer and not as a rent-seeker. The informational constraint on
the government introduces a distortion to the full-information bench-
mark. The possibility of destruction mutes the investor's incentives,
and forces the government to be softer in its negotiations provided
that the bad outcome is sufﬁciently severe. The message of this result
is that inefﬁciencies in decision-making can arise simply from informa-
tional constraints on a government rather than from rent-seekingmoti-
vation. Therefore, softness in the government's dealing with external
investors in less developed economies should not necessarily be taken
as evidence of bureaucratic dishonesty or corruption. In fact, we point
out that the inefﬁciency may actually go in the other direction: If the
government ﬁnds it preferable to ban resistance, then suboptimal
redistribution reduces themarginal value of surplus andmakes the gov-
ernment too aggressive compared to the full information benchmark.
7.2. Future research
There are other interesting questions that are closely linkedwith the
issue of resistance to private investment. For example, we assume that
resistance has a public cost and creates externality to the whole society.
Theoretically, affected individuals can potentially signal the private
information with actions that involves private cost.20 It would be inter-
esting to have a systematic analysis on when and why the groups may
ﬁnd it optimal to signal through activities with high public cost.
We have considered that a government can redistribute the surplus
freely. This is an extreme assumption since redistributing surplus comes
not in terms of lump-sumpayments but setting up changes in the struc-
ture of the local economywhichmay involve deadweight losses. The ac-
tual effects will depend on how such losses are distributed across
groups, and it would be valuable to study such effects in detail.
We recognize that in dealing with an investor, governments may
face severe external constraints in the form of competing governments.
There is a large literature on tax competition in Public Finance that
shows that local governments might end up with a race to the bottom
in trying to attract a monopoly investor (see Rauscher, 1995; Hauﬂer
and Wooton, 1999 for two related instances). It is easy to show in our
model that when two governments compete for a single investor, they
will engage in a subsidy war where both lose, and all the gains accrue
to the investor. Such awarmay lead to economic inefﬁciencies as the in-
vestormightﬁnd it proﬁtable to locate in a less action-pronedestination
(high λ) rather than a more productive destination (low k). This obser-
vation also indicates that the political structure of a society (e.g., extent
of marginalization of relevant groups) matter for determining the
investment destination. It is a challenge for governments in less devel-
oped economies to solve this problem by coordinating with each
other. A possible solution would be for the more productive region to
get the investment and arrange some side payments with the other
society. We look into such alternative solutions in our further research.
Appendix A
Proof of Lemma 2. First we derive the optimal transfer for any belief
μ ∈ [0, 1].
Claim L2a. Suppose x N 0. For beliefs μ ∈ [0, 1],
t μ; að Þ ¼ λwA að Þ− 1−λð Þ μwB v; að Þ þ 1−μð ÞwB v; að Þ
h i
:
The transfer to group B is strictly increasing in μ if a b 1 and constant
if a= 1.
Proof of Claim L2a. Denote the maximand μW v; a; t ′ð Þ þ 1−μð ÞW
v; a; t ′ð Þ by EμW(a, t′). Now,
dEμW a; tð Þ
dt
¼ d
dt
μS v; að Þ þ 1−μð Þ v; að Þ½ 
− d
dt
μ λ wA−t
 
− 1−λð Þ wB vð Þ þ t
 h i2
− d
dt
1−μð Þ λ wA−t
 
− 1−λð Þ wB vð Þ þ t
 h i
¼ 2 λ wA−t
 
− 1−λð Þ μwB vð Þ þ 1−μð ÞwB vð Þ þ t
n oh i
:
Therefore, d
2EμW a;tð Þ
dt2
¼−2, and themaximumoccurswhereλ wA−t
 
−
1−λð Þ μwB vð Þ þ 1−μð Þ wB vð Þ þ t  	 ¼ 0 , implying t μ; að ÞλwA að Þ−
1−λð Þ μwB v; að Þ þ 1−μð ÞwB v; að Þ
 . Since wB v; að Þ−wB v; að Þ ¼ v−vð Þx
1−að Þ, it is easy to see that for given a, the transfer t(μ, a) is strictly in-
creasing in μ if x N 0 and a b 1. If x=0 or a=1 t(μ, a)= 0 for all μ. Thus
Claim L2a is proved. We now proceed to derive all separating equilibria
of the signaling game.
Claim L2b. Suppose x N 0 and Assumption 1 holds. Then, the set of
separating equilibria of the signaling subgame is given by actions a∈
aL;min aH;1f g½  and a ¼ 0, where
aL ¼
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v   ; and aH ¼ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þλ vA þ v  :
Proof of Claim L2b. The proof proceeds in two steps. First, we estab-
lish that in any separating equilibrium, the high-valuation type sets
a ¼ 0. Then, we establish the range of a in equilibrium. In this proof,
sometimes we abuse notation by writing t(0, a) as t v; að Þ and t(1, a)
as t v; að Þ.
In any separating equilibrium, we have μ að Þ ¼ 0 and μ að Þ ¼ 1. Sup-
pose that aN0. In a separating equilibrium, the transfer to the high
type is t v; að Þ and the resultant utility of the high type is λ vþ vA 

1−að Þ þ τx. On the other hand, the payoff obtained from deviating to
a = 0 is vxþ t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ þ sτx. Now, from Claim L2a, since μ(0) ≥ 0,
we must have t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ≥t v;0ð Þ. Therefore,
vxþ t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ þ sτx≥vxþ t v;0ð Þ þ sτx
¼ λ vþ vA
 
þ τ
h i
xNλ vþ vA
 
1−að Þ þ τ
h i
x:
We can then say that the deviation payoff is strictly higher than the
equilibrium payoff if aN0 since vþ vAN0 by Assumption 1, and x N 0.
This establishes that a ¼ 0 in any separating equilibrium. Next, we
turn to the determination of a.
A necessary condition that the optimal level of actions a;0ð Þ would
have to satisfy is that neither type would gain by misrepresenting its
own type. Let wB(a, t|v) denote group B's payoff given its true marginal
19 As an alternative proposal for “just compensation”, Ghatak and Ghosh, 2011 propose a
land auction where landholders can choose to be paid in land or cash. Such an auction can
implement the efﬁcient allocation. Efﬁciency arises costlessly in their model since there
are multiple affected parties who are at least partially substitutable. In our model, there
is a single affected party. See Ghatak and Mookherjee, 2011 and Roy Chowdhury, 2013
for other critiques of LARR 2011.
20 Uba (2008)mentions events of hunger strikes – an activity with private cost – as a de-
vice to gain public and politicians' attention in the context of anti-privatization mobiliza-
tion in India. However, the data on such events has been limited.
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valuation v, a redistributive transfer t, and an action a. The no-lying
constraint for the high type is
wB 0; t v;0ð Þ vj Þ≥wB a; t v; að Þ vj Þð

ð8Þ
and the no-lying constraint for the low type is
wB a; t v; að Þjvð Þ≥wB 0; t v;0ð Þjvð Þ ð9Þ
By rearranging terms, we see that inequalities (8) and (9) can be
summarized as
vax≥Δt að Þ≥vax; where Δt að Þ ¼ t v; að Þ−t v;0ð Þ:
The gain in transferΔt að Þ from representing oneself as of having low
valuation by taking an action of level a is given by
Δt að Þ ¼ x 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ þ a 1−λð Þv−λvA
 h i
:
After rearranging terms, we see that in any separating equilibrium,
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v   ≤a≤ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þλ vA þ v  ð10Þ
where the upper bound comes from condition (9) and the lower bound
from condition (8). Condition (10) is only necessary for there to be a
separating equilibrium. It can be checked that any a∈ aL; aH½  will be
an equilibrium, given beliefs
μ að Þ ¼ 0 if a∈ 0; a½ Þ∪ a;1ð 
1 if a ¼ a :

A separating equilibriumexists only if [aL,min{aH, 1}] is a non-empty
interval. By inspection, it is easy to see that if vþ vAN0, aL∈ (0, 1). Fur-
ther, we see that
aH−aL ¼
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ2
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v 
 λ vA þ v  ; ð11Þ
and thus aH N aL if and only if v
A þ v
 
≥0, which holds true given
Assumption 1. Thus Claim L2b is proved.
We are now going to show that there is a unique separating equi-
librium that survives the Intuitive Criterion. To see this, consider any
separating equilibriumwithaNaL, anda ¼ 0. That there exists such an
a is guaranteed by that fact that since v−vN0, we will never have 0 in
the right hand side of Eq. (11). Consider some action a′∈ aL; að Þ. For
any belief μ ∈ [0, 1],
wB a′; t μ; a′ð Þ vjð Þ ¼ vx 1−a′ð Þ þ t μ; a′ð Þ þ sτx≤vx 1−a′ð Þ þ t v; a′ð Þ
þsτx ¼ vx 1−a′ð Þ þ λ vAx 1−a′ð Þ þ 1−sð Þτx
nh o
− 1−λð Þ vx 1−a′ð Þ þ sτxf g
i
þ sτx ¼ λτx
þ λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv
n o
x 1−a′ð Þbλτx
þ λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv
n o
x 1−aLð Þ ¼ λτx
þ λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv
n o
x 1− 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv
 
¼ λτxþ λ vA þ v
 
x ¼ λ vA þ vþ τ
 
x
¼ wB 0; t v;0ð Þ vj Þ:ð
Therefore, for all possible beliefs μ arising from action a′, the high
typewould get a lower utility fromplaying a′ that it does in equilibrium.
Thus, a′ is equilibrium dominated for the high type, and hence wemust
have μ(a′)=1. If μ(a′)= 1, then the payoff of the low type fromplaying
action a′ is
wB a′; t v; a′ð Þð vj Þ ¼ λ v þ vA
 
1−a′ð Þ þ τ
 
x Nλ v þ vA
 
1−að Þ þ τ
 
x
¼ wB a; t v; að Þ vj Þ:ð
Therefore, the low type has a deviation yielding a higher payoff than
the equilibrium payoff. Thus, the separating equilibriumwith aNaL, and
a ¼ 0 does not survive the Intuitive Criterion. □
Proof of Proposition 5. It is easy to see that the investor's optimal
investment for a given tax rate is xns(τ) = k(q− τ). The optimal invest-
ment tax maximizes G's payoff, which is
pW v;0; tns
 þ 1−pð ÞW v;0; tns 
¼ vA þ EvB
 
xns τð Þ þ τxns τð Þ− pL v;0; tns þ 1−pð ÞL v;0; tns 
 
¼ vA þ EvB
 
xns τð Þ þ τxns τð Þ−F xns τð Þ
 2
ð12Þ
where F ¼ p 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2: Solving, we get τns ¼ q− vAþEvBð Þ½ þ2qkF2þ2kF .
Replacing τns and xns in Eq. (12), we can derive G's equilibrium
payoff. □
Proof of Proposition 6. Fix v; v and λ, and consider We and Wns as
functions of p. Now, it is easy to see that
Wns pð Þ
We pð Þ ¼
N pð Þ
S pð Þ
 2
where
N pð Þ ¼ v
A þ EvB þ qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p ; F pð Þ ¼ p 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 ð13Þ
S pð Þ ¼ vA þ EvB þ q
 
−pae vA þ v þ q
 
; ae ¼ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v  :
ð14Þ
Since vA þ EvB þ q
 
−pae vA þ v þ q
 
N0, we can say that Wns(p) ≶
We(p) if and only if N(p) ≶ S(p).
First, notice thatN 0ð Þ ¼ S 0ð Þ ¼ vA þ vþ q. Also,N 1ð Þ ¼ vA þ v þ q N
S 1ð Þ ¼ 1−aeð Þ vA þ v þ q  since ae ∈ (0, 1). Next, note that
dS pð Þ
dp
¼ v−vð Þ−ae vA þ v þ q
 
b0 ð15Þ
and by Eq. (14), S(p) is a downward sloping straight line. On the other
hand,
dN pð Þ
dp
¼ 1
1þ kF pð Þ v−vð Þ
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
q
− vA þ EvB þ q
  k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2
2
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þp 1−2pð Þ
( )
¼ v−vð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p − vA þ EvB þ q  k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2
1þ kF pð Þð Þ32
1
2
−p
 
:
ð16Þ
Notice that
dN pð Þ
dp
p¼0 ¼ v−vð Þ−12 k vA þ vþ q  1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2: ð17Þ
Next, we claim that for any p∗ ∈ (0, 1) for which N(p) = S(p), we
must have dN pð Þdp N
dS pð Þ
dp . To prove, let us assume that, if possible, the above
claim does not hold true. Then there is some p∗ ∈ (0, 1) satisfying
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N(p) = S(p), and dN pð Þdp ≤ dS pð Þdp . Therefore, by Eqs. (16) and (17), for p∗, we
must have
v−vð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p − vA þ EvB þ q  k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2
1þ kF pð Þð Þ32
1
2
−p
 
≤ v−vð Þ−ae vA þ v þ q
 
; or
vA þ EvB þ q
  k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2
1þ kF pð Þð Þ32
1
2
−p
 
−ae vA þ v þ q
 
≥ v−vð Þﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p − v−vð Þ:
Since p∗ N 0,
ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p
N1, and since v−vð Þb0, the right hand side is
strictly positive. Therefore, we must have
vA þ EvB þ q
  k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2
1þ kF pð Þð Þ32
1
2
−p
 
Nae vA þ v þ q
 
: ð18Þ
From Eqs. (13) and (14), sinceN(p)= S(p) at p∗, we have vA þ EvB þ
q ¼ pae vA þ v þ q = 1− 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þkF pð Þ
p
 
. We can therefore rewrite Eq. (18)
as
ae vA þ v þ q
  k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 12−p
 
p
1− 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þkF pð Þ
p
 
1þ kF pð Þð Þ32
Nae vA þ v þ q
 
;
which is true if and only if
1− 1ﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p ! 1þ kF pð Þð Þ32bk 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1
2
−p
 
p
⇔ 1þ kF pð Þð Þ32− 1þ kF pð Þð Þbk 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1
2
−p
 
p; or
⇔ 1þ k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1−pð Þp
h i3=2
bk 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1
2
−p
 
pþ 1
þk 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1−pð Þp ¼ 1þ k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2p 3
2
−2p
 
:
ð19Þ
Now, from the Taylor series expansion of the left hand side,
1þ k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1−pð Þp
h i3=2
N1þ 3
2
k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 1−pð Þp
¼ 1þ k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2p 3
2
−3
2
p
 
N1þ k 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2p 3
2
−2p
 
ð20Þ
since p∗ N 0. Inequality (20) is a contradiction to inequality (19). Since
inequality (19) is false, condition (18) is not satisﬁed. This proves our
claim that that for any p∗ ∈ (0, 1) for which N(p) = S(p), we must
have dN pð Þdp N
dS pð Þ
dp . An immediate implication is that whenever N(p
∗) =
S(p∗) other than p∗= 0, N(p) should cut S(p) from below. This implies
that there is at most one solution to N(p) = S(p) for p ∈ (0, 1]. To see
that, suppose there were more than one solutions to N(p) = S(p). By
Claim 1, in case of each solution, N(p) should cut S(p) from below. But
since both N(p) and S(p) are continuous, by the intermediate value
theorem, between any two such distinct solutions, there must be
some p′ such that N(p′) = S(p′) where N(p) cuts S(p) from above.
This is a contradiction to Claim 1. From Claim 1, it follows that there is
at most one solution to N(p) = S(p) for p ∈ (0, 1]. Also, if there exists
such a solution p∗, for p b p∗, N(p) b S(p) and for p N p∗, N(p) N S(p).
Moreover, since N(1) N S(1), we must have p∗ b 1.
Since N(0) = S(0), there is an interior solution p∗ to the equation
N(p) = S(p) if and only if there is some ϵ N 0 such that N(p) b S(p) for
the interval (0, ϵ). Such an ϵ exists if and only if dN pð Þdp b
dS pð Þ
dp at p = 0.
Comparing Eqs. (15) and (17), the condition is
ae vA þ v þ q
 
b
1
2
k vA þ vþ q
 
1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2: ð21Þ
Condition (21) can be broken down further as
1−λð Þ vA þ v
 
− 1−λð Þ vA þ v
 h i
N
vA þ v þ q
 
vA þ vþ q  2k v−vð Þ : ð22Þ
Taking (1− λ) = x, vA þ v ¼ a and vA þ v ¼ b; we can rewrite con-
dition (22) as f xð Þ≡ ax2−bxþ 2k b−að Þ aþqbþq b0. Now, f(0) N 0 and f′′(x) =
a N 0. Thus, we have at most an interval of x such that f(x) b 0. If that
range is [x1, x2], then λ ¼ max 1−x1;0f g and λ ¼ max 1−x2;0f g. Since
f(0) N 0, we have x1 N 0, implying λb1. Also, f 1ð Þ ¼− b−að Þ þ 2k b−að Þ aþqbþq.
Making a small enough, we can have f(1) b 0, which implies
that λ ¼ 0. □
Proof of Lemma 7. The proof of this lemma proceeds in several steps.
While deriving the optimal transfer for a given belief, we see that
the Claim L2a, made in the proof of Lemma 2 holds. Thus, the transfer
t(μ, a) is strictly increasing in μ except if a= 1 or x= 0, in which case,
t(μ, a) is constant in μ. Now, suppose that in a separating equilibrium,
the high valuation type takes action a and the low valuation type
takes action a:
To check that a ¼ 0, suppose otherwise. In a separating equilibrium,
the transfer to the high type is t v; að Þ and the resultant utility of the high
type is λ vþ vA  1−að Þ þ τ−qa
 x . On the other hand, the payoff
obtained from deviating to a= 0 is vxþ t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ þ sτx. Therefore,
vxþ t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ þ sτx≥vxþ t v;0ð Þ þ sτx
¼ λ vþ vA
 
þ τ
h i
xNλ vþ vA
 
1−að Þ þ τ−qa
h i
x:
We can then say that the deviation payoff is strictly higher than the
equilibrium payoff if aN0 since vþ vAN0 by Assumption 1, and x N 0.
This establishes that a ¼ 0 in any separating equilibrium.
Next, we turn to the determination of a. As in the proof of Lemma 2,
the range of a satisﬁes
vax≥Δt að Þ≥vax; where Δt að Þ ¼ t v; að Þ−t v;0ð Þ:
Now, we have for the transfers
t v; að Þ ¼ λ½vAx 1−að Þ þ sAτx−rAqax− 1−λð Þ½vx 1−að Þ þ sBτx−rBqax
t v;0ð Þ ¼ λ½vAxþ sAτx− 1−λð Þ½vxþ sBτx:
Hence, the gain in transfer Δt að Þ from representing oneself as of
having low valuation by taking an action of level a is given by
Δt að Þ ¼ t v; að Þ−t v;0ð Þ ¼ x 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ þ a v 1−λð Þ−λvA
n oh i
þ qax 1−λð ÞrB−λrA
n o
The range of a given byh
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ þ a v 1−λð Þ−λvA
n oi
þ a 1−λð ÞrB−λrA
n o
≤ vaþ rBaq
aL′ ¼
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v þ λq ≤a
and that
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ þ a v 1−λð Þ−λvA
n oi
þ a 1−λð ÞrB−λrA
n o
≥vaþ rBaq
aH′ ¼
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
λ vA þ v þ λq ≥a:
It can be easily checked that aL′ b min{aH′, 1} and thus, a separating
equilibrium always exists. Notice that aL′ b aL = ae.
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Now, we turn to reﬁning the set of equilibria using the Cho–Kreps
criterion and showing that any equilibrium satisfying the criterion
has the property that the action of the low valuation type a∗ satisﬁes
a∗ b ae. In particular, we show that no a with aNmax aL′;
aL
1þλq
o
satisﬁes
the Cho–Kreps criterion.
Consider any separating equilibriumwithaNmax aL′;
aL
1þλq
n o
, anda ¼ 0:
Consider some action a′∈ max aL′; aL1þλq
n o
; a
 
. For any belief μ ∈ [0, 1],
wB a′; t μ; a′ð Þjvð Þ ¼ vx 1−a′ð Þ þ t μ; a′ð Þ þ sτx−rBqa′x≤vx 1−a′ð Þ
þ t v; a′ð Þ þ sτx−rBqa′x
¼ vx 1−a′ð Þ þ þsτx−rBqa′xþ ½λfvAx 1−a′ð Þ þ 1−sð Þτx
− rAqa′xg− 1−λð Þfvx 1−a′ð Þ þ sτx−rBqa′xg
¼ λτxþ λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv
n o
x 1−a′ð Þ
− λrA− 1−λð ÞrB þ rB
 
qa′x
¼ λτxþ ½λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv½1−a′ 1þ λqð Þx
b λτxþ ½λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv½1−aLx
¼ λτxþ ½λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv 1− 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
λvA þ v− 1−λð Þv
 
x
¼ λτxþ λ vA þ v
 
x ¼ λ vA þ vþ τ
 
x ¼ wB 0; t v;0ð Þð jv

:
Therefore, for all possible beliefs μ arising from action a′, the high
typewould get a lower utility fromplaying a′ that it does in equilibrium.
Thus, a′ is equilibrium dominated for the high type, and hence wemust
have μ(a′)=1. If μ(a′)= 1, then the payoff of the low type fromplaying
action a′ is
wB a′; t v; a′ð Þjvð Þ
¼ λ v þ vA
 
1−a′ð Þ−a′qþ τ
 
xNλ v þ vA
 
1−að Þ−aqþ τ
 
x
¼ wB a; t v; að Þjvð Þ:
Therefore, the low type has a deviation yielding a higher payoff than
the equilibrium payoff. Thus, the separating equilibrium with aNmax
aL′;
aL
1þλq
n o
, and a ¼ 0 does not survive the Intuitive Criterion.
Proof of Proposition 9. Suppose the government commits to a com-
pensation ﬂoor of T N 0. In order to ﬁnd optimal ﬂoor, we ﬁrst ﬁnd the
outcome for a given T and then calculate the optimal ﬂoor. Suppose
x N 0. For beliefs μ ∈ [0, 1], the transfer to group B is given by
t f μ; að Þ ¼

t μ; að Þ if t μ; að ÞNT
T if t μ; að Þ≤T ; where
t μ; að Þ ¼ λwA að Þ− 1−λð Þ½μwB v; að Þ þ 1−μð ÞwB v; að Þ
Claim P9a. tf(μ, a) is weakly increasing in μ and strictly so if t(μ, a) N T
and a b 1.
Proof of Claim P9a. Suppose there was no ﬂoor to transfer. Now, it is
easy to see that the expectedwelfare toG is concave in t, andmaximized
at t(μ, a). If the ﬂoor binds, i.e., t(μ, a) ≤ T then the constrained maxi-
mum occurs at T. The rest of the proof follows proof of Claim L2a,
made in the proof of Lemma 2 above.
Claim P9b. In any separating equilibrium, a ¼ 0.
Proof of Claim P9b. If T≤t a; xð Þ, then the proof holds by Claim L2b,
made in the proof Lemma 2 above. Suppose now thatT Nt a; xð Þ. Suppose
that aN0. In a separating equilibrium, transfer to the high type is T. And,
the resultant utility of the high type is ½v 1−að Þxþ sτxþ T. On the other
hand, the payoff obtained from deviating to a = 0 is vxþ t f μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ þ
sτx. Now, from Claim P9a, since μ(0) ≥ 0, we must have tf(μ(0), 0) ≥
T. Therefore, comparing payoffs
vxþ t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ þ sτx½ − vx 1−að Þ þ T þ sτx½ 
¼ vxaþ t μ 0ð Þ;0ð Þ−T≥vxaN0:
This establishes that a ¼ 0 in any separating equilibrium.
Claim P9c. Given a signaling game with a compensation ﬂoor, in the
welfare maximizing separating equilibrium, we must have
af ¼
λvA− 1−λð Þv
h i
−Tx
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v  and af N0:
Proof of Claim P9c. Suppose in the signaling game with x N 0, equilib-
rium transfer to the low type is t að Þ and that to the high type is T. For
separation, we need aN0 and vax≥ t að Þ−T≥vax. As,
t að Þ ¼ λ vA 1−að Þ þ 1−sð Þτ
h i
x− 1−λð Þ v 1−að Þ þ sτ½ x
¼ λvA− 1−λð Þv
h i
1−að Þx
we must have
λvA− 1−λð Þv
h i
−Tx
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v  ≤a≤ λv
A− 1−λð Þv
h i
−Tx
λ vA þ v  :
To see that λυ
A− 1−λð Þυ½ −Tx
υAþυð Þ− 1−λð Þ υAþυð Þb
λυA− 1−λð Þυ½ −Tx
λ υAþυð Þ ; notice that (i) since we have
separation, we must have t að ÞNT , implying that λυA− 1−λð Þυ
  1−að ÞN
T
xwhichmakes the numerator positive, and (ii) υ
A þ υ − 1−λð Þ υA þ υ 
Nλ υA þ υ  sinceυNυ. Moreover, the assumption thatλN vvAþv implies that
for somepositive T, there exists a separating equilibriumwithaN0. There-
fore the “best” separating equilibriumof the signaling game requiresaf ¼
λvA− 1−λð Þv½ −Tx
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þ and a
f N 0 (which we verify at the end).
Notice that the extent of action is a decreasing function of
the compensation ﬂoor. However, if T is larger than λvA− 1−λð Þv
 x,
we no longer have a separating equilibrium, (i.e., af ¼ a ¼ 0). Notice
also that when T ¼ t ajxð Þ, we have af = ae. Therefore, af ≤ ae. We now
write
af ¼
λvA− 1−λð Þv
h i
−Tx
vA þ v − 1−λð Þ vA þ v  ¼ α−β Tx
where α ¼ λvA− 1−λð Þv
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þ and β ¼ 1vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þ.
Next consider the investor's problem. It is easy to see that the opti-
mal investment, for a given level of action a and investment tax τ, is k
[q(1− pα)− τ]. And, the government chooses τ and T to maximize
W f T; τð Þ ¼ 1−pð Þ vA þ v
 
þ p vA þ v
 
1−α þ β T
x
  
xf τð Þ þ τxf τð Þ
− 1−pð ÞL v;0; τð jTÞ
where L v;0; τjTð Þ ¼ λ wA 0ð Þ−T
 
− 1−λð Þ wB 0ð Þ þ T
 h i2
¼ λvA− 1−λð Þv
 
xf τð Þ−T
h i2
:
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Therefore,
W f T; τð Þ ¼ 1−pð Þ vA þ v
 
þ p vA þ v
 
1−α þ β T
xf τð Þ
 !" #
xf τð Þ
þτxf τð Þ− 1−pð Þ λvA− 1−λð Þv
 
xf τð Þ−T
h i2
¼ 1−pð Þ vA þ v
 
þ p vA þ v
 
1−αð Þ
h i
xf τð Þ þ τxf τð Þ
þp vA þ v
 
βT− 1−pð Þ λvA− 1−λð Þv
 
xf τð Þ−T
h i2
¼ Vxf τð Þ þ τxf τð Þ þ p vA þ v
 
βT
− 1−pð Þ λvA− 1−λð Þv
 
xf τð Þ−T
h i2
:
Taking derivative with respect to T, we get ∂W
f T;τð Þ
∂T ¼ p vA þ v
 
β þ
2 1−pð Þ λvA− 1−λð Þv xf τð Þ−T
  and ∂2W f T;τð Þ∂T2 ¼−2T N0 . Hence, we
obtain
T− λvA− 1−λð Þv
 
xf τð Þ ¼ C
where C ¼ p2 1−pð Þ v
Aþv
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þ
h i
and we can therefore conclude that,
irrespective of the scale of investment, the optimal compensation
ﬂoor implements a constant level of “extra compensation” in addi-
tion to the amount that is optimal in the high state given the scale
of investment (provided af N 0). To check whether af N 0, we need
λvA− 1−λð Þv
h i
xf τð ÞNT , or equivalently (after some simple algebra),
xf τð ÞN C
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ. Notice now that while τ is endogenous, x
f(τ) can be in-
creased unboundedly by increasing q. Therefore, if q is large enough, our
“interior solution” holds, and the optimal compensation ﬂoor indeed
provides an extra compensation of C∗. □
Proof of Proposition 10. The optimal transfer strategy in this case is
similar to that discussed in Lemma 2.
Claim P10a. Suppose x N 0. For beliefs μ ∈ [0, 1],
t μ; að Þ ¼ λwA að Þ− 1−λð Þ μwB v; að Þ þ 1−μð ÞwB v; að Þ
h i
:
The transfer to group B is strictly increasing in μ if a b 1 and constant
if a= 1.
The proof is exactly similar to the proof of Claim L2a, and hence
skipped.
ClaimP10b. Suppose x N 0. Then the set of separating equilibria of the sig-
naling subgame is given by actions a ¼ 0 and a∈ aL;1½  , where aL ¼
1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þð Þ.
Proof of Claim P10b. The proof is similar to the proof of Claim L2b,
discussed in the proof of Lemma 2, except that Eq. (9), which earlier
led toa≤aH, nowyields thata≥aH. The term aHhas the sameexpression
as before, but is now negative (which is what is responsible for the re-
versal of the inequality). In other words, the no lying constraint of the
low type does not bind.
Claim P10c. Suppose x N 0. Then the unique separating equilibrium of the
signaling subgame that satisﬁes the Cho–Kreps criterion isa ¼ 0anda ¼ 1:
Proof of Claim P10c. First, note that aL b 1. Now, consider any separat-
ing equilibriumwith ab1. Consider some action a′∈ a;1ð Þ The rest of the
proof is the same as that of Lemma L2b. Notice that, for the last step,
there is a crucial inequality
λ v þ vA
 
1−a′ð Þ þ τ
 
xNλ v þ vA
 
1−að Þ þ τ
 
x
While this inequality holds in Lemma L2b sincev þ vAN0anda′ba, in
the present case it holds because v þ vAb0 and a′Na. □
Appendix B
Two-part investment tariff
Consider a two-part tariff of the form τ0 + τ1x, where x is the size
of investment. For given τ0, τ1 and a size of investment x, if the total
tax transfer (τ0 + τ1x) from the investor to the society is positive, we
say that the investment is taxed; otherwise subsidized. Subsequent-
ly, we study investor-friendliness under different regimes by com-
paring the total transfer from the investor to the society. For a
given size of investment x, we say that investment is subsidized
(taxed) if τ0 + τ1x ≤ (≥)0. We assume that the investor's reserva-
tion utility is zero. The socially efﬁcient level of investment that max-
imizes the expected social value of investment, vA þ EvB þ q x−x22k, is
given by xe = k(vA + EvB + q).
The following lemma is useful in characterizing the equilibrium out-
comeunder different regimes. It describes the investor's optimal invest-
ment and the government's optimal investment tax policy for a broader
class of payoff functions.
LemmaB1. Suppose the investor's pre-tax proﬁt from investment isQx−x22k
and the government's pre-tax payoff is Vx. Then, for any two-part tar-
iff (τ0, τ1), the optimal level of investment chosen by the investor is x∗=
k(Q− τ1∗). In the policy stage, the government's optimal choice of tariff is
τ0 ¼
k
2
Q þ Vð Þ2; and τ1 ¼−V :
The government's maximal payoff is k2 Q þ Vð Þ2 . Further, the total
transfer from the investor to the society is k2 Q
2−V2
 
, and consequently
the investment is taxed if and only if V b Q.
Proof. Given a two-part tariff (τ0, τ1) the optimal size of investment
x(τ0, τ1) maximizes Qx−x22k−τ1x−τ0
 
, and thus given by k(Q− τ1). At
the policy stage, the government's payoff is Vx(τ0, τ1) + τ1x(τ0, τ1) +
τ0. It is easy to see that the investor at the optimal contract, can-
not receive a utility strictly above her reservation utility. Other-
wise, the government can increase its payoff by increasing τ0,
but keeping the investor still above her reservation utility. We
can therefore set τ1xþ τ0 ¼ Qx−x22k, and the government's payoff
as Vx τ0; τ1ð Þ þ Qx τ0; τ1ð Þ−x τ0 ;τ1ð Þ22k −u0. Solving the ﬁrst order condi-
tions, we ﬁnd that the payoff maximizing τ0 and τ1 are given by
τ1 ¼−V ; τ0 ¼ k2 Q þ Vð Þ2. At the optimal, the government's payoff
is Vx τ0; τ

1
 þ Qx τ0; τ1 −x τ0 ;τ1ð Þ22k ¼ k2 Q þ Vð Þ2: The total transfer
from the investor to the society is τ0 þ τ1x τ0; τ1
  ¼ k2 Q2−V2 . □
The benchmark case: Full information
Consider the case when groups' marginal valuation from invest-
ment is public information. The government's expected pre-tax
payoff is (vA + EvB)x where EvB ≡ 1−pð Þvþ pv and the investor's
pre-tax return from investment is qx−x22k . A direct application of
Lemma B1 gives the equilibrium investment and tax policy as follows.
Proposition B1. Consider a situation in which groups' marginal valua-
tions are public information. The equilibrium level of investment and the
optimal tariff policy are as follows: xo = k(q − τ1o), τ1o = − vA − EvB
and τo0 ¼ k2 qþ vA þ EvB
 2
. Further, the government's expected pay-
off is Wo ¼ k2 qþ vA þ EvB
 2
, and the investment is taxed if and only if
vA + EvB b q.
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Comparing the above result with the corresponding proposition in
case of proportional taxation, we see that the investment is efﬁcient
with two part tariff, and the government's payoff under two-part tariff
is higher than that under proportional taxation. However, the
government's investor friendliness result is not affected if we allow
two-part tariff.
Private information and signaling
Consider the case when group B's marginal valuation of the pro-
ject is private information and B can signal by taking a costly public
information. It is important to note that when we solve the optimal
inter-group transfer and the equilibrium level of resistance, we con-
sider the total investment tax transfer and the size of investment as
given. Therefore the equilibrium resistance required to reveal infor-
mation does not depend on the precise functional form of the tax
function, but rather the total amount of transfer, which depends on
τ0, τ1 and x. The equilibrium inter-group transfer and the resistance
will therefore be exactly the same as they had been in case of propor-
tional taxation.
Lemma B2. Suppose x N 0 and Assumption 1 holds. Then there exists a
unique separating equilibrium in the signaling subgame that satisﬁes the
Cho–Kreps Intuitive Criterion. In this equilibrium, group B takes a costly ac-
tion only when it realizes a low valuation from the project. The equilibrium
level of action is given by ae ¼ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þ
vAþvð Þ− 1−λð Þ vAþvð Þð Þ . Further, at the unique
separating equilibrium, the equilibrium intergroup transfers in both states
are set to make the weighted inequality loss to be zero.
To solve for the optimal investment and investment tariff policy, note
that the investor's expected payoff is given by q 1−paeð Þx−x22k−τ1x−τ0,
and the government's expected payoff is given by
vA þ EvB−pae vA þ v
  
xþ τ1xþ τ0:
Applying Lemma B1, we can solve for the equilibrium investment
and tariff, which are described in the following proposition.
Proposition B2. Assume that group B's valuations of the project is pri-
vate information and it can signal through costly public action. At the
unique separating equilibrium satisfying Intuitive Criterion, the equilib-
rium investment is xe = k(q(1− pae)− τ1o) and the equilibrium two
part tariff is given by τe1 ¼− vA þ EvB−pae vA þ v
  
and τe0 ¼ k2
vA þ EvB þ q−pae vA þ v þ q
  2
. The investment is taxed if and only
if vA þ EvB−q bpae vA þ v−q . In equilibrium, G receives an expected
payoff ofWe ¼ k2 vA þ EvB þ q
 
−pae vA þ v þ q
 h i2
.
Comparing the above result with Proposition B1, we see that
government's payoff decreases as we introduce informational asymme-
try. The total size of investment also decreases from xo = k(q + vA +
EvB) to xe ¼ k qþ vA þ EvB−pae vA þ v þ q  . When we compare our
results with the corresponding results under proportional taxation, we
see that the government's payoff is higherwhen it offers a two-part tar-
iff. The condition that determines whether or not investment is taxed,
however remains unchanged.
The alternative regime: No signaling
Next, consider the casewhen there is no signaling (and therefore no
cost), and the government has to implement a redistribution scheme
without the precise knowledge of the group valuations. At the redistri-
bution stage, the government implements an inter-group transfer that
maximizes the expected welfare, and commits not to renegotiate it. As
we derive it in the proportional taxation, the tax offered to the investor
is given by
tns ¼ argmax
t∈R
pW v;0; tð Þ þ 1−pð ÞW v;0; tð Þ
¼ argmax
t∈R
pL v;0; tð Þ þ 1−pð ÞL v;0; tð Þ
¼ λwA 0ð Þ− 1−λð ÞEwB vB;0
 
whereEwB vB;0
 
¼ pwB v;0ð Þ þ 1−pð ÞwB v;0ð Þ.G incurs inequality loss
in both states and the losses are given by
L v;0; tns
  ¼ p 1−λð Þ v−vð Þx½ 2 ð23Þ
L v;0; tns
  ¼ 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ v−vð Þx½ 2:
The optimal investment tax τns maximizes
vA þ EvB
 
xns τð Þ þ τxns τð Þ− pL v;0; tns þ 1−pð ÞL v;0; tns 
  ð24Þ
¼ vA þ EvB
 
xns τð Þ þ τxns τð Þ−F xns τð Þ
 2
where F ¼ p 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2. The following proposition describes
the equilibrium under no-signaling.
Proposition B3. Assume that group B's valuations of the project is pri-
vate information, but it cannot convey the information to the govern-
ment. Then in the unique SPNE of the game, G incurs positive
inequality loss in both states, given by Eq. (23). The size of investment
and the investment tariffs are given by xns= k(q− τ1ns) and τns0 ; τns1
  ¼
qxns− x
nsð Þ2
2k −τns1 xns;
2qkF− vAþEvBð Þ
1þ2kF
 
where F ¼ p 1−pð Þ 1−λð Þ2 v−vð Þ2 . In
equilibrium, G receives an expected payoff of Wns ¼ k2 qþv
AþEvBð Þ2
1þ2kF .
Proof. The optimal size of investment is given by xns τ0; τ1ð Þ ¼ arg max
x
qx−x
2
2k
−τ1x−τ0
 
, which is k(q− τ1). The optimal investment tax τns
maximizes Eq. (24).G is however, constrained by the fact that the inves-
tor at the optimal contract, cannot receive a utility strictly above her
reservation utility, which we assume to be zero. This implies that τ1xþ
τ0 ¼ qx−x22k, and the government's payoff as vA þ EvB þ q
 
xns τ0; τ1ð Þ−
xns τ0 ;τ1ð Þ2
2k −F xns τ0; τ1ð Þ½ 2 . Solving the ﬁrst order conditions, we ﬁnd
that the payoffmaximizing τ1 is given byτns1 ¼ 2qkF− v
AþEvBð Þ
1þ2kF . Consequently,
τns0 ¼ qxns−
xns
 2
2k
−τns1 x
ns and xns ¼ k q−τns1
 
:
Putting the optimal values of two part tariff and investment in (24),
we get that the government's equilibrium payoff is k2
qþvAþEvBð Þ2
1þ2kF . □
Comparing the above with the corresponding results under propor-
tional taxation, we see that the government's payoff is higher when it
offers a two-part tariff. We are now able to ﬁnd out the economic
value of resistance by comparing G's payoff under signaling with that
under no-signaling, given that G offers a two part investment tariff.
The ratio of the two payoffs is given by
Wns pð Þ
We pð Þ ¼
vA þ EvB þ qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ 2kF pð Þ
p
vA þ EvB þ q −pae vA þ v þ q  
" #2
:
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The equivalent expression under proportional investment tax has
been
Wns pð Þ
We pð Þ ¼
vA þ EvB þ qﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃﬃ
1þ kF pð Þ
p
vA þ EvB þ q −pae vA þ v þ q  
" #2
:
As the above two expressions, as functions of p and λ, behave exactly
the sameway, the Proposition 5 (which holds true for all positive values
of k) remains valid under two part tariff.
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